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INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s, foreign issuers started to sell subordinated
debentures in the United States market, pursuant to indentures
invoking New York law. One notorious junk bond was the subject
of intense litigation in Allstate Life Insurance Co. v. Linter Group
Ltd.' In that case, the following crude fraud was alleged. An
Australian debtor, whom I will call D, sought to issue a debenture
in the United States. The underwriters, Drexel, Burnham &
Lambert, advised D that the bonds could not be sold because there
was too much bank debt on D's books. To disguise some of this debt,
D requested a subset of its lenders, whom I shall collectively
designate as X, to release its claims against D until the "junk"was
peddled. The junk bonds were then issued to a class of creditors,
whom I shall call C1. Soon after C purchased the bonds, D gave X
the old claims back. None of this was disclosed to C 1. Later, new
lenders, C 2 , advanced funds to D. C2 was fully knowledgeable about
X's claim and Cl's claim but unaware of the fraud perpetrated by X
on C1 . D soon filed for bankruptcy protection in Australia.2
In the Australian proceeding, X anticipated a dividend worth well
into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Under the law of New York,
its misconduct arguably would generate two distinct claims for C,.
First, X's claim against D was a fraudulent conveyance. According
to the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) to which New
York adheres, the creation of an obligation deliberately intended to
defraud creditors can be "set aside."3
Second, X's conduct might justify a claim of equitable
subordination of X's claim to that of C,. Assuming equitable
subordination is a good claim under New York law, and that X's
claims should be equitably subordinated, how should the remedy
be administered? C2 did not deserve a remedy, because it knew all
about X's claims. C1 was the only party harmed.

1. 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993).
2. Id. at 997-98.
3. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 7, 9(1)(a), 7A U.L.A. 113, 198 (1999).
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The usual interpretation of fraudulent transfer law is that X's
claim is simply disallowed or rescinded. Under this interpretation,
C2 , whose claim dwarfed that of C,, would get the lion's share ofX's
enormous bankruptcy dividend (even though C2 was not harmed
by X's conduct). Similarly, equitable subordination is usually
interpreted to mean that X is demoted to a priority below all of the
creditors of D. Under this interpretation, C2 would once again
capture most of the benefit, even though C2 was not defrauded.
Should C2 gain a huge windfall because X arguably defrauded C,?
Certainly not. There is an alternate way of looking at the universe
of fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination that would
avoid this unjustified result.
Under this alternative theory C is the sole beneficiary of the
remedy, C2 is neither helped nor harmed by it, and X is more likely
to obtain a surplus after C,'s claim is paid out. According to this
alternative theory, fraudulent transfer law does not set aside X's
claim. Nor does equitable subordination compel X to stand in line
behind all the creditors. Rather, fraudulent transfer law and
equitable subordination assign X's claim exclusively to C, as
security for C1's claim.
Linter Group, then, invites a deep inquiry into the nature of these
remedies.' Consider first the fraudulent transfer claim. Suppose D
transfers property to X or creates a fraudulent obligation. Suppose
these transfers or debts are simply void. In Linter Group, this
would mean that C1 shares the remedy with C 2 .
This picture, however familiar, is a metaphoric error. "Metaphors
in law," Justice Cardozo once warned, "are to be narrowly watched,
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it." 5 Strongly indeed does this observation manifest itself
in fraudulent transfer law, which has enslaved itself to the
language of avoidance, rescission, and annulment, when what is
4. In presenting the question this way, I deliberately ignore the fact that C1 had
contractually subordinated itself toXand C,. C2 therefore had this additional argument: just
as equitable subordination is the assignment ofX's claim to C1 , contractualsubordination is
the assignment of C,'s claim to C 2. See David Gray Carlson, A Theory of ContractualDebt
Subordination and Lien Priority, 38 VAND. L. REv. 975 (1985). Because contractual
subordination was present in the case, whatever rights C, had were transferred over to
Cr-including C,'s fraudulent transfer rights against X.
5. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
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really going on is transfer. Avoidance is the wrong concept for
fraudulent transfer. Rather, the thing is transferredto C1 . From the
beginning, X holds the thing in trust for C,-not for C2 .
Under the Bankruptcy Code, it is especially clear that avoidance
is the wrong concept. Avoidance of a fraudulent transfer does not
mean that the transfer disappears. According to § 551:
Any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 547, 548,
549, or 724(a) of this title, or'any lien void under section 506(d)
of this title, is preserved for the benefit of the estate but only
with respect to property of the estate.6
This section virtually confesses that avoidance is a misnomer.
According to the Bankruptcy Code, avoidance means preservation
for the benefit of the estate.7 Preservation, not avoidance, should be
the theme of fraudulent transfer's tongue. 8
Likewise, demotion is the wrong concept for equitable subordination. According to the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts
are invited to subordinate the claims of wicked creditors to the
claims of those creditors with finer deportment.9 The usual view of
the matter is that the evil creditor is demoted behind all other
creditors. Yet § 510(c) specifically provides for subordination to
specific creditors in appropriate cases. General demotion cannot
serve when, as in the Linter Group case, only specific creditors are
harmed.
This Article proposes that we jettison the metaphors of avoidance and demotion. Instead, this Article proposes that the concept
that organizes these bodies of law is transfer. The fraudulently
transferred thing is not returned to the debtor. The wicked creditor
is not demoted. Rather, the property and claims off are transferred
to C 1 . Insofar as D is concerned, D has conveyed away her property
forever, and D definitely must pay the subordinated claim.

6. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).

7. See id.
8. See David Gray Carlson, Security Interestsin the Crucible ofVoidablePreferenceLaw,
1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 357 (1995). This is well understood by Germans, for whom
"aufgehoben" means simultaneously "to cancel or negate" and "to preserve." See David Gray
Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quality,22 CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 452-53 (2001).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2000).
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Replacing the concept of avoidance, annulment and subordination
with the notion of transfer brings commercial law discourse into
closer identity with its actual logical structure, while steering clear
of the injustice that sometimes results when courts enslave
themselves to these metaphors. The transfer concept allows for a
unified account of both fraudulent transfer law and the law of
equitable subordination.
Both fraudulent transfer law and the law of equitable subordination entail the same remedy of expropriation and transfer.
The moral intuition behind the two doctrines, nevertheless, has
come to differ. Fraudulent transfer law focuses on the debtor's
intent to cheat her creditors-though intent is presumed in the socalled "constructive" fraud cases.10 Equitable subordination, on the
other hand, focuses on creditor misconduct. 1 Whereas the debtor's
intent is examined at the time of the fraudulent transfer, creditor
action unrelated to the origin of the creditor's claim can justify
equitable subordination. 2
The concepts of rescission, avoidance, and demotion have led to
a series of confusions. For example, fraudulent transfer law is
subject to the notorious rule of Moore v. Bay,"3 but equitable subordination doctrine is not. According to Moore v. Bay, a bankruptcy
trustee is subrogated to an individual creditor's fraudulent transfer
rights, but these rights must be used for the benefit of all the
creditors equally. 4 Moore v. Bay, then, turns on the rescission
theory of fraudulent transfer. In contrast, equitable subordination
expressly permits creditors to benefit individually from the subordination of a wicked creditor. If, however, equitable subordination
and fraudulent transfer remedies are the same, the limitation of
Moore v. Bay to fraudulent transfer cases cannot be justified.
Indeed, Moore v. Bay should itself be understood as driven by
metaphorical confusion as to the nature of avoidance theory. 5

10. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27.

11. See infra text accompanying note 116.
12. This is the inverse of the analysis found in Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the
CorporateDebtor to Its Creditors,90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977). Dean Clark found the moral
intuition to be the same, but the remedies to be different. See id. at 533.

13. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
14. See id. at 5.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 128-29.
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By way of a second example, courts have erroneously supposed
that state law cannot effectuate equitable subordinations. Rather,
equitable subordination is considered to be a uniquely federal
remedy. 16 If, however, equitable subordination is simply the
fraudulent transfer remedy in the special context of a collective
proceeding, this conclusion must be rejected--equitable subordination is indeed part of a state's general common law.' 7 This
principle would have served greatly in Linter Group, where Ci's
indenture invoked New York law but not the American Bankruptcy
Code.18
To establish the identity of these two seemingly diverse remedies,
this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the fraudulent
transfer remedy. The laws provide for two such remedies. First,
16. The leading case on this point is HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623 (2d Cir.
1995), wherein the court said:
The doctrine of equitable subordination ... simply does not apply to state-law
fraudulent conveyance claims. Equitable subordination is distinctly a power of
federal bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, to subordinate the claims of one
creditor to those of others ....
Unlike the Bankruptcy Code, the [state fraudulent transfer law] is a set of
legal rather than equitable doctrines whose purpose is not to provide equal
distribution of a debtor's estate among creditors, but to aid specific creditors
who have been defrauded by the transfer of a debtor's property.
Id. at 634 (citations omitted). For this proposition, the court cited two law review articles
that simply recite the history of equitable subordination as stemming from federal
bankruptcy jurisprudence. Id. Nowhere do these articles maintain that equitable
subordination cannot be instituted outside of federal bankruptcy court jurisdiction. See
Helen D. Chaitman, The EquitableSubordinationofBank Claims,39 Bus. LAW. 1561 (1984);
Scott M. Browning, Note, No Fault Equitable Subordination,34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487
(1993).
17. The conclusion that state law does not provide for equitable subordination of claims
is becoming common. See Greenfield v. Shuck, 867 F. Supp. 62,70 (D. Mass. 1994) (refusing
to fashion a common law rule of priority outside of the bankruptcy setting); In re SPM Mfg.
Corp., 163 B.R. 411,413 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (stating that equitable subordination claims
are "applicable only in bankruptcy"); Primex Plastics Corp. v. Lawrence Prods. Inc., No. 89
Civ. 2944 (JSM), 1991 WL 183367, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1991) (explaining that equitable
subordination has no foundation in New York state law); In re Poughkeepsie Hotel Assocs.
Joint Venture, 132 B.R. 287, 292 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[Equitable subordination ... is
peculiar to bankruptcy law and an issue which can only be decided in a bankruptcy setting.").
One court went so far as to hold that a Chapter 11 filing isperse in good faith if it is tied to
an equitable subordination claim. Since equitable subordination cannot be maintained
outside ofa bankruptcy court, a Chapter 11 case must be sustained if equitable subordination
is appropriate. 9821 Shore Rd. Owners Corp. v. Seminole Realty Co. (In re 9821 Shore Road
Owners Corp.), 187 B.R. 837, 852-54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).
18. Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 1993).
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transfers of property are avoided or set aside. Second, fraudulent
obligations are annulled. Each of these italicized terms will be
exposed as misnomers. In actuality, fraudulent transfer law assigns
the property of third parties to the defrauded creditors as security
for their claims. The assignment (not avoidance) of fraudulently
conveyed property is then compared to the annulment of an
obligation created by a debtor. Just as "set aside" or "avoidance"
presents a false picture of the fraudulent transfer remedy, so
annulment of an obligation is equally misleading. Obligations are
not annulled but are transferred-assigned for security-to the
creditor with the fraudulent transfer right.
Armed with this insight, Part II examines the equitable subordination remedy and shows that it is precisely the same as
annulment of an obligation under fraudulent conveyance law. That
is to say, a creditor's claim is not subordinated but is assigned to
those creditors harmed by the creditor's inequitable conduct. Part
II also shows that the origin of equitable subordination doctrine is,
historically speaking, drawn from the state law of fraudulent
transfer. This further supports the point that, structurally, equitable subordination is simply the fraudulent transfer remedy in
disguise and that both remedies can be considered to be within the
competence of state law to achieve.
Why has this point been missed heretofore? In the average case,
the proper characterization of the remedy makes no practical
difference. Indeed, this is a necessary condition for deficient legal
theory to survive. Most of the time the metaphors of rescission
and avoidance reach the right result. Typically, a bankruptcy
trustee recovers a fraudulent transfer for all the creditors, or the
subordination of a creditor is total.
The misconception is exposed for what it is, however, when a
surplus exists, and when only a few (not all) creditors have rights
against the lost thing. If there is a surplus, avoidance implies that
the debtor obtains the surplus, not the third party to whom
property was fraudulently conveyed. Furthermore, fraudulent
transfer law distinguishes between present creditors, whose claims
existed at the time of the fraudulent transfer, and future creditors,
whose claims postdate it.19 Sometimes present creditors have rights
19. For examples of this distinction in action, see In re FBN Food Servs., Inc., 82 F.3d
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when future creditors have none. The rescission or erasure theory
of fraudulent transfer does not provide a mechanism to administer
this distinction. Rescission always means that all creditors benefit.
A transfer theory honors the distinction by permitting present
creditors to recover while future creditors do not.
In equitable subordination, Bankruptcy Code § 510(c) directly
authorizes subordination to some creditors as well as to all
creditors. 20 A general demotion theory, or standing in line, simply
does not suffice when subordination is to a mere subset of creditors.
These cases are rare,2 ' but marginal cases like Linter Group (which
was far from marginal in terms of dollars) force us to re-theorize the
center. The marginal cases demonstrate that avoidance, annulment,
and subordination are misnolners. What is really going on in all
cases is transfer of specific property rights. This Article presents a
more complete theory-one that accounts for both the center and
the margin. Because it solves more cases coherently than the
existing theory, it qualifies as the more adequate explanation for
the nature of fraudulent transfer law and the law of equitable
subordination.

I.

FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW

A. The Substantive Standard
Contrary to the usual stereotype, debtors are strong and creditors
are weak. Debtors know they are finished, and that is their
strength. To spite their creditors, they can convey their assets
instantly to favored third parties, whereas creditors (if they are
unsecured) must engage in expensive, time-consuming procedures
in order to collect. Fraudulent transfer law evens the playing field.
Fraudulent transfer permits creditors to retrieve from third parties

1387 (7th Cir. 1996); Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 34 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2000).
21. Subordination to specific creditors is routine, however, under § 509(c), which governs
sureties who are in competition with the creditors whose claims they have guaranteed. See
11 U.S.C. § 509(c) (2000). It is also routine in contractual subordination cases. See infra Part
II.B. 1.b.
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property that the debtor has conveyed in order to delay or hinder
collection.22
Substantively speaking, fraudulent transfer can be divided into
two types. First, there are cases in which the third party transferee pays value. These I will call "exchanges." Second, there are
transfers in which the third party does not pay value. These shall
be informally referred to as "donations."
First and most classically, transfers specifically intended to
hinder, delay or defraud creditors are fraudulent-even if they are
exchanges and even if the debtor is solvent at the time. 23 Third
party transferees, however, are accorded protection if they are good
faith transferees for value. 2 ' The paradigmatic intentional fraud on
creditors is the bulk sale. In a bulk sale, the debtor sells assets to
a creditor who provides the liquidity the debtor needs to flee the
jurisdiction. If the creditor is not a good faith purchaser for value,
the assets purchased become susceptible to the judicial liens of
creditors. Many other fraudulent transfers are of this type. For
example, in a leveraged buyout, a debtor typically issues a mortgage
to a bank in order to provide the cash needed to redeem shares.
Provision of this liquidity in order to finance dividends potentially
qualifies as a fraudulent transfer of this type.'
The second and by far most common type is the so-called
constructive fraudulent transfer. A constructive fraudulent transfer
is a donation26 by an insolvent person.2 ' As always, the adjective
22. See generally David Gray Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 643 (1987) (arguing that fraudulent conveyance law is about comparative
power of debtors and creditors, not about economic efficiency).
23. Empire Lighting Fixture Co. v. Practical Lighting Fixture Co., 20 F.2d 295,297 (2d
Cir. 1927).
24. According to the UFTA § 8(a), "[a) transfer or obligation is not voidable under Section
4(aXl) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or
against any subsequent transferee or obligee." UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 8(a),
7A U.L. 351 (1999). The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) limits protection to
"purchasers." UNiF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 198 (1999). "Purchaser"
usually connotes that the transferor has made a voluntary conveyance. E.g., U.C.C. § 1201(32) (2001).
25. See David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73,120-21
(1985).
26. "Donation" here is loosely used to describe transfers for no reasonably equivalent
value. It comprehends dividends and stock redemptions by insolvent corporations and
suretyship agreements for the benefit of strangers by insolvent debtors.
27. Insolvency draws different sorts of definitions. Under Bankruptcy Code §
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"constructive" confesses a theoretical failure. The idea of the
constructive fraudulent transfer is that the courts will presume a
donation is a deliberate attempt to divert assets away from
creditors, even if the intent of the debtor is benevolent.2"
Both types of fraudulent transfers-the exchange and the
donation-focus on the state of affairs at the time the fraudulent
transfer is made. Intentional frauds require an inquiry into the
debtor's state of mind at the time property is conveyed or an
obligation is incurred. Constructive fraudulent transfers entail an
examination of the debtor's solvency at the time of the transfer,
coupled with the absence of a reasonably equivalent value.
Although this Article will show that the equitable subordination
remedy is a fraudulent transfer remedy, the standards for equitable
subordination differ from the standards of fraudulent transfer law.
In equitable subordination law, courts do not necessarily limit their
inquiry into the debtor's financial or mental state at the time the
subordinated claim is created (although this is often relevant).
Rather, they impose a forfeiture on wicked creditors for acts taken
subsequent to the creation of the claim. An action for equitable
subordination may not entail debtor misbehavior at all, and may
involve creditor misconduct only.'
B. The Remedy
The thesis of this Article is that fraudulent transfer law does not
rescind transactions. Rather, it transfers debtor property directly
to the creditors. This can be seen on the face of the uniform legislation that most states have adopted. According to the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), a defrauded creditor may obtain
548(aX1)(BXii), for example, insolvency encompasses a debtor who:

(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in
business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor
was an unreasonably small capital; or
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would
be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
11 U.S.C. § 548(aX1XBXiiXI)-I) (2000).
28. See Nasabu Corp. v. Harfred Realty Corp., 39 N.E.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. 1942).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 138-47.
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"avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to
satisfy the creditor's claim .... 30 The emphasized language is
significant. A transfer or obligation is never completely avoided. It
is only avoided to the extent necessary to satisfy a designated
creditor. In the older UFCA, a defrauded creditor may have the
transfer "set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary to
satisfy his claim .... ,3' Once again, conveyances are not set aside
absolutely. They are set aside only to the extent necessary.
Certainly as a matter of state law, the fraudulently transferred
thing does not return to the debtor. Rather, fraudulent transfer law
stands for the proposition that creditors may impose judicial liens
on the property of non-debtors, when such property or obligation
was fraudulently conveyed or created by a debtor. Insofar as the
debtor is concerned, the debtor has permanently and forever
alienated her property or has definitely obligated herself to pay
some third party.
The UFTA is different in this regard from the Bankruptcy Code,
whose language it otherwise largely replicates. 2 Under Bankruptcy
Code § 548(a), a trustee has a direct right to recover fraudulent
transfers." There is no reference to "extent necessary," though I
have argued elsewhere that it should be implied.3 '
Both at state law and in bankruptcy, however, courts have
forgotten the dependent clause "to the extent necessary" and have
instead rescinded the transfer altogether, so that what a debtor
conveyed away is the debtor's property once more.
This point will be emphasized in the illustrations to follow. In
these illustrations, D is a debtor who fraudulently conveys property
or creates a claim on behalf of X. X can therefore be a donee (in the

30. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERACT § 7(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 339 (1999) (emphasis added).
31. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(lXa), 7A U.L.A. 198 (1999) (emphasis
added).
32. One of the major stated reasons for the UFTA was to conform the language of state
law to that of the Bankruptcy Code. See 7A U.L.A. 268 (1999); see also Frank R. Kennedy,
The Uniform FraudulentTransfer Act, 18 UCC L.J. 195, 198-99 (1986).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2000).
34. See generally David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy'sOrganizingPrinciple,26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 549 (1999). The thesis of this article is that bankruptcy trustees are creditor
representatives, and trustee avoidance powers therefore have a quantitative limit measured
by the claims the trustee represents. Ifa surplus exists after the trustee avoids conveyances,
the surplus is beyond the bankruptcy estate because of this quantitative limit.
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case of a constructive fraudulent transfer), a contracting party (in
the case of a fraudulent sale for cash or credit), or a creditor of D (in
the case of a fraudulently created obligation). C, stands for a
creditor of D with a fraudulent transfer right against X. C2 , C3 , and
C 4 (collectively, C 2 4 ) are creditors ofD, but unless context otherwise
indicates, they have no fraudulent transfer cause of action against
X.
A word should be said about why C, could have fraudulent
transfer rights against X when C 24 do not. If a transfer is fraudulent, can any creditor of D avoid it? The answer is no. The state
law of fraudulent transfer creates subsets of those creditors who
can recover and those who cannot. For example, the UFTA, picking
up a distinction introduced in the UFCA, distinguishes between the
fraudulent transfer rights of present creditors and present and
future creditors."5 Present and future creditors can obtain as'sets
from X whenever D fraudulently conveys property or incurs an
obligation:
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor
of the debtor; or
(2)without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business of transaction;
or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or
her] ability to pay as they became due.3
In addition, present and future creditors can pursue X if D
transferred property at a time she intended to incur a debt she

35. On this distinction, see Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); Coleman v. J&B
Enters., Inc. (In re Coleman), 291 B.R. 894, 897-98 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003); John E. Sullivan

III, Future Creditorsand FraudulentTransfers: When a Claimant Doesn't Have a Claim,
When a Transaction Isn't a Transfer, When Fraud Doesn't Stay Fraudulent and Other
Important Limits to FraudulentTransfers Law for the Asset ProtectionPlanner,22 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 955, 966-67 (1997).
36. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a), 7A U.L.A. 301 (1999).
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could not pay, or if D is insufficiently capitalized to conduct a
business .
Only present creditors can pursue Xs property "if the debtor
made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor
became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation." 31 Why
does fraudulent transfer law distinguish between present and
future creditors? One possible justification is that, where D's only
fault is that she is insolvent on her balance sheet, C24 should
investigate her creditworthiness and should not be allowed to
subject X's property to their liens as a substitute for good research.
On the other hand, where X is an "enabler" in an intentional fraud,
is insufficiently capitalized in general, or believes a debt will arise
that X cannot pay, D and X are colluding in presenting a false
economic picture of D's true worth. Under these circumstances,
future creditors are invited to fix their liens on X's thing.3 9
In the illustrations that follow, the Article first examines the
plain vanilla case of a fraudulent transfer of property from D to X.
Second, the Article examines annulment of X's claim against D.
1. Property Is Conveyed
Suppose, while insolvent, D transfers a thing to X for no
equivalent value. Accordingly, C1 may obtain "avoidance of the
transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the
creditor's claim ....' As emphasized earlier, D's transfer is not set
37. Id.
38. UNIF.FRAUDULENTTRANSFERACT § 5(a), 7AU.L.A. 330 (1999). Furthermore, present
(but not future) creditors can pursue X's property "if the transfer was made to an insider for
an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent." Id. § 5(b).
39. Admittedly, this is what Duncan Kennedy once called "inducling] the premises from
the data of the rules." Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on
the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 955 (1985). Another possibility is that
the present-future distinction in the UFCA is simply an unintentional mistake.
40. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 339 (1999). The older UFCA
formulation is somewhat different. It provides that a defrauded creditor may:
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent
necessary to satisfy his claim, or
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aside completely. Rather, it is set aside to the extent necessary to
pay C 1 . Beyond this necessity, D's transfer is not set aside but is
quite valid. If the fraudulent transfer is simply rescinded, then C 1's
action equally benefits C 2.4 . Yet these future creditors ex hypothesi
do not have any fraudulent transfer rights at all.
Fraudulent transfer law never reestablishes D's ownership of
the thing. Rather, it is clear that X and C, are the owners. X has
legal title, and this is held in trust for C,. Classically, C,'s fraudulent transfer right was strictly an in rem right against property
owned byX.4 1Xwas, in effect, a nonrecourse guarantor of C Z's claim
against D. IfX were to convert this property to her own use, C, has
the option of suing in conversion (an in personam theory) or
pursuing the thing in rem in the hands of X's transferee.2 If,
however, X did not wrongfully interfere with C,'s property, C1 had
no conversion theory and no in personam right against X.4
Meanwhile, D is simply out of the picture. D has alienated the thing
forever.
The UFTA recently altered this classical in rem concept. Under
the UFTA, C, may, apparently at will, substitute an in personam
remedy against X.44 Under the older UFCA, X is not personally
obligated to C1 (unless X wrongfully interferes with C,'s property
right). Under the UFTA, the fraudulent transfer is the wrongful
act of conversion that makes X personally liable to C z . X's liability,
however, is limited to the value of the property actually conveyed.
The courts have been much confused by the language of avoidance. Instead of emphasizing avoidance to the extent necessary,
courts have assumed that D's transfer is set aside entirely. What
D gave to X is now D's property once again, so that C1 and C2 _4 can
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property
conveyed.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(1), 7A U.L.A. 198 (1999).
41. See, e.g., Am. Nat'l Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.),
714 F.2d 1266, 1272 (5th Cir. 1983); Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Interstate Cigar Co.
v. Interstate Distribution, Inc., 620 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (App. Div. 1994) (finding no right to
money damages).

42. If X's transferee is a bona fide purchaser for value, however, such a defendant will
have a valid defense. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(1), 7A U.L.A. 198 (1999).

43. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 615 (2d Cir. 1955).
44. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(b), 7A U.L.A. 351 (1999); see First Nat'l Bank
v. Hooper, 48 S.W.3d 802, 808-09 (Tex. App. 2001) (involving in personam liability for
property valued at time of fraudulent transfer).
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obtain judicial liens against it. 4 5 Thus, to some courts, fraudulent
transfer law is injunctive; it commands X to take the formal steps
necessary to convey the property back to D."6 Once this is
accomplished, D is supposedly the owner of the property again, and
C1's judicial liens can now be enforced. 7
An example of metaphoric confusion at work is Acequia, Inc. v.
Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.),48 where a fraudulent transfer was
recovered by the bankruptcy trustee. A surplus remained after all
the creditors were paid. Properly, X should have owned this surplus, because the fraudulent transfer should have been avoided only
to the extent necessary to pay the creditors. The Ninth Circuit,
however, ruled that D, not X, was the owner of the surplus because,
in effect, the fraudulent transfer had been avoided.49 What was
once D's thing became D's thing again. Since D was entitled to
any surplus under Bankruptcy Code § 726(a)(6), Xlost all status in
the distributional scheme. Ownership of the surplus is one circumstance where the rescission theory of fraudulent transfers can do
serious mischief. 50
45. United States v. Coppola, 85 F.3d 1015, 1023 (2d Cir. 1996) (ordering X to convey
property back to D so that C can enforce directly against D); Glassman v. Glassman, 131
N.E.2d 721, 726 (N.Y. 1956) ("The actual effect of this suit is to set aside the fraudulent
conveyance, thereby returning the ownership of the funds to the individual defendant, and
plaintiff's recovery will, for all intents and purposes, be against him.'); Spencer v. HyltonSpencer, 709 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (App. Div. 2000) (same). For example, in North Fork Bank
v. Schmidt, 697 N.Y.S.2d 106 (App. Div. 1999), C, had a judgment againstD and was the first
to join X in a fraudulent transfer action. Id. at 107. C. later obtained a judgment against D,
but was the first to docket in the county where the land was actually located. Id. The
Appellate Division remanded for further findings; it assumed that, by docketing against D,
C2 docketed against X's real estate. Id. Thus, C2 would prevail, even though C, was the first
to bring the fraudulent transfer action. This could only be so if the transfer by D was totally
void.
46. HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1995).
47. Provocatively, the UFCA also authorizes the sheriff to levy X's property as if D still
owned it. Carried to its extreme, this provision would permit the sheriff to ignore X
altogether, advertise the sale of Xs house and foreclose on C,'s judgment lien as if D still
owned the house. Needless to say, there are major due process concerns here. Surely X is
entitled to notice and a hearing before her property is taken to satisfy D's creditors. The case
law has never really addressed these concerns, possibly because no litigant has ever sought
to press her luck by pushing this option too far. Instead, X is joined as a party-a confession
that the transfer from D to X is not really void or annulled after all.
48. 34 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 804.
50. See Douglas v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 S.W.2d 801,802 (Tex. 1931)(finding thatXshould
get the surplus).
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Acequia is a § 548(a) case, where the language "to the extent
necessary" does not appear. Nevertheless, such words should be
implied. There is no excuse for awarding the surplus to D when a
fraudulent transfer is recovered in a bankruptcy proceeding. 51
5 2 metaphorical error had
In Mendelsohn v. Thaler(In re Faraldi),
an important substantive effect. In Faraldi, D conveyed real
property to X. C1 docketed a judgment against D (but took no action
against X). Under New York law, docketing a judgment in a local
county creates a lien on D's real estate. D, however, had no real
property whatsoever at that time. Rather, it was owned by X in
trust for the creditors of D, including C,.
D was soon bankrupt. The trustee correctly claimed that X's
property was property of the bankruptcy estate, because the trustee
could subrogate to the rights of C2 and avoid the fraudulent
conveyance to X. The Faraldicourt, however, ruled that C, was a
secured creditor in the bankruptcy by virtue of docketing a
judgment against D.53 This conclusion is purely the product of
metaphorical error. If, per the metaphor, D still owned property at
the time C, docketed, then the court was right. But if D had
alienated his land to X, the court was wrong.5 4
Faraldi can be criticized for not attending to the bona fide
purchase defense in the UFCA.5 5 If indeed C, has a lien on X's
51. A similar case is In re FBN Food Servs., Inc., 82 F.3d 1387 (7th Cir. 1996). In that
case, the court recognized thatX should properly get the surplus. Id. at 1395. There is dictum
in this case to the effect that, ifXmust surrender the fraudulent transfer, then Xhas a claim

inD's bankruptcy. See id. at 1391-92. This would solve the problem of getting the surplus to
X, but it is hard to justify the notion that just because X is divested of property fraudulently
transferred by D and therefore held in trust for the creditors, X is a creditor of D. Rather
than inventing the premise that X has an allowable claim in D's bankruptcy, it would be
better to acknowledge that the bankruptcy trustee can simply recover to the extent of
creditor claims.

52. 286 B.R. 498 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002).
53. Id. at 503.
54. The Faraldicourt found the governing law to be "sparse." Id. But it found conclusive
a remark by Judge Learned Hand to the effect that "[a] fraudulent conveyance is void under

the New York statute, and may be disregarded...." Empire Lighting Fixture Co. v. Practical
Lighting Fixture Co., 20 F.2d 295,296 (2d Cir. 1927). In fact, the case involved a "creditor's
bill in equity," where C, was indeed in the process of avoiding D's conveyance to X. For cases
following Faraldi'sregrettable metaphysics, see Cullen Center Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In
re Criswell), 102 F.3d 1411 (5th Cir. 1997). See also Coleman v. J&B Enters., Inc. (In re
Coleman), 291 B.R. 894 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003).
55. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 198, 199 (1999).
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property upon docketing against D, how can X convey the
encumbered land to a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value?
Such persons take subject to docketed liens. Indeed, Faraldi,if
followed, creates havoc for title searching because, on Faraldi's
logic, any docketing of a lien against a predecessor in interest
might encumber X's property in spite of generations of bona fide
purchases.
5 6 where
Another example of harmful error is Colombo v. Caiati,
D fraudulently conveyed a house to X. Thereafter, C, filed a lis
pendens against X1's property, placing the world on notice that C,
was claiming a fraudulent transfer. A lis pendens implies that X,
could not effectively convey the land to any bona fide purchaser for
value free and clear of C,'s right. X, then conveyed the encumbered
land back to D. D then mortgaged the land to X 2 . X 2 claimed the
land free and clear of C,'s fraudulent transfer right.
Properly speaking, C, should have prevailed. When D alienated
the land to X,, D terminated any and all interest in the land. X,
owned the fee simple in trust for C,, and C1 had a nascent right to
attach a lien on this property. Because of the lis pendens, there
could be no question of a bona fide purchaser for value. When X,
conveyed the land back to D, C,'s rights were still valid and plainly
present in the chain of title. X 2 therefore should have been deemed
a bad faith purchaser (i.e., knowledgeable purchaser whose
mortgage was junior to any future judicial lien that X, might obtain
on D's land).
The court, under the spell of metaphorical confusion, ruled that
C, had no right against X 2 .57 Reconveyance to D was "the very relief
requested by the plaintiffs in their underlying action based on a
fraudulent conveyance ...." Hence, C,'s nascent right went out of
existence, and D owned the house free and clear of C1 's fraudulent
conveyance right. As a result, D's title was supposedly unencumbered when D conveyed a mortgage to X2. Such a result is
possible only if setting aside a conveyance means pretending it
never happened. This is not what fraudulent conveyance does,
however. Rather, it makes X the constructive trustee for C1 .
56. 493 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
57. Id. at 247.

58. Id.
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Avoidance, then, should be viewed as a misnomer. Fraudulent
transfer law renders X the constructive trustee for property for the
benefit of C1 . It does not rescind D's transfer.
At first, it might seem that the rescission theory helps to bail
voidable preference law out of a conceptual difficulty that exists in
the Bankruptcy Code but that did not exist in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898.
To see why, suppose C1 has already commenced a supplemental
proceeding against X before the bankruptcy petition. These proceedings typically create a lien on X's thing in favor of C at the
time the proceeding is commenced.59 The existence of C,'s lien
implies that C has become a secured creditor in D's bankruptcy
-not a mere unsecured creditor with a potential avoidance right.
In the forgotten case of Metcalf v. Barker,"° C, brought suit against
X more than four months before the bankruptcy petition. At that
time, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided:
That all ... liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a

person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be
deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the
property affected by the ... lien shall be deemed ... released ...

and shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the
bankrupt, unless the court shall, on due notice, order that the
right under such ... lien shall be preserved for the benefit of the

estate; and thereupon the same may pass to and shall be

59. See generally Note, Prioritiesof Creditors UnderJudgment Creditor'sBills, 42 YALE
L.J. 919 (1933) (discussing timing issues relating to multiple creditor claims); but see In re
Leonard, 125 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 1997). In this case, C, filed a suit and a 1is pendens against
X. The Leonard court held that these actions created no lien for C1 on X's property, since
Illinois abolished the creditors' bill in equity in 1980. Rather, the court required C, to obtain
one of the remedies listed in UFTA § 8(a), which mentions attachment or "other provisional
remedy," injunctions, receivers and "any other relief the circumstances may require."
In truth, Illinois did not repeal the concept of the creditors' bill so much as to change its
name to "supplementary proceeding." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1 2-1402. There is no good

reason to think that nominal change is accompanied by substantive change, with regard to
establishing C,'s priority to X's property. The supplemental proceeding easily fits within
UFTA § 8(a)'s"other provisional remedy" or "any other reliefthe circumstances may require."
Nevertheless, the result was correct in Leonardfor the reasons stated infra in the text
accompanying notes 73-74.
60. 187 U.S. 165 (1902).
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preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate as
aforesaid."1
In Metcalf,the Supreme Court ruled that, under New York law, C,'s
lien arose at the commencement of the lawsuit, prior to the four
month period.62 For that reason, C1 was a secured creditor in D's
bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Act § 60(f), as promulgated in 1898,6" was broad
enough to bring C,'s lien into the bankruptcy estate-provided C,
obtained the lien against X's thing in the four month period.
Unfortunately, this provision was abolished when the Bankruptcy
Code was enacted.
Today, courts would like to believe that C,'s lien is a voidable
preference, within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 547(b). Yet §
547(b) requires a transfer of debtor property within the ninety day
preference period. When D fraudulently transfers to X more than
ninety days before bankruptcy, D creates property interests in X
and C, at that time and retains no property whatever in the thing.
Later, when C, obtains a lien in the preference period, the lien can
only constitute a transfer from X, not D.
Admittedly, C1 received an inchoate, "unperfected" transfer from
D directly more than ninety days before bankruptcy, when the
fraudulent transfer occurred." Later C, "perfected" her interest by
commencing a proceeding against X within the preference period.
But at this time, the property was solely X's (held in trust for D's
creditors). It was in no sense D's property. Yet § 547(e)(2)(B) has a
timing rule that must be considered. According to § 547(e):

61. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (repealed 1978).
62. Metcalf, 187 U.S. at 172. The explanation for this is that C, already has a judgment
against D. The action against X therefore constitutes an "equitable execution" against X's
property. GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 151 (rev. ed.
1940). Where C, seeks to set aside a transfer before judgment, Professor Glenn, at least,
protested that there should be no lien. Id. at 56-57. See generallyNote, supra note 59, at 92930 (considering entitlements to the benefit of a lien arising from a judgment creditor's suit).
63. This provision was later re-numbered and modified as § 67(a). Chandler Act of 1938,
52 Stat. 840,875 (1938). No similar provision survived in the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, C1 's
lien is analyzed under the voidable preference statute.
64. Julie Sirota Karchin, Note, FraudulentConveyance as a PropertyRight, 9?CARDOZO
L. REV. 843 (1987).
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For the purposes of this section ... a transfer is made(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or
within 10 days after, such time ...;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is
perfected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such transfer is not perfected at the later of(i) the commencement of the case; or
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee.6 5
Perfection of a transfer is defined in § 547(e)(1)(B), which provides
"a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is
perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a
judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee."6 6
Applying this definition to the case at hand, one would have to
admit that C1 obtained an unperfected lien on X's thing more than
ninety days before bankruptcy. It became perfected during the
preference period. Yet, at that time, D did not even own the thing.
The timing rule in § 547(e)(2)(B) simply does not function in a case
where D disposes of her equity before a lien is perfected.
If we insisted on applying the timing rules as written, then,
during the preference period, when D actually did perfect, we would
have topretend, at that time, that D still owned the thing. Based on
this fiction, it becomes possible to conclude that C1 received a
voidable preference. But this is an unattractive method. Surely we
cannot pretend D owns property in order to get a result we want.
Rather, it must be the case that D conveyed property to C, and X
long before the preference period.6 7

65. 11 U.S.C. § 547(eX2) (2002).

66. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1XB) (2002).
67. In an earlier study, I considered the following case: supposeD conveys an unperfected
security interest to C, and then sells the equity to X (a bad faith purchaser) prior to the
preference period. The timing rules turn to mush under this scenario. How can we say that
D transferred the security interest in the preference period when D did not even own the
collateral at that time? Rather, it should be the case that the security interest is deemed
transferred just beforeD conveys the equity toX. Section 547(e) does not provide for this, but
no other solution makes sense. GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND
CARLSON ON SECURED LENDING: CLAims IN BANKRUPrCY 120-21 (2000).
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In support of this conclusion, consider yet another relevant
situation. Suppose D has granted a security interest to SP covering
all present and future general intangibles. D then fraudulently
transfers property to X. If D really has an interest in X's thing, then
SP's security interest attaches to X's obligation to return that thing
to D. The presence of an Article 9 security agreement would prevent
C, or a bankruptcy trustee from ever recovering the fraudulent
transfer. If, on the other hand, D has alienated the thing forever,
SP's security interest does not attach," and the creditors are free
to pursue X's thing.
Yet many will think that C, has violated the spirit of creditor
equality that lies behind voidable preference law. In truth, C, falls
to the trustee, but not because C, has received a voidable
preference. Rather, if the bankruptcy trustee has a direct § 548(a)
theory against X, or if she can subrogate herself to C2 or some other
creditor of D, she can avoid D's conveyance to X. Bankruptcy Code
§ 550(a)(1) makes clear that the trustee may recover the
fraudulently transferred thing from the initial transferee or from
the transferee of a transferee. C1 constitutes the transferee of a
transferee, by virtue of the lien arising from her action against X.
Of course, transferees of transferees have a defense under § 550(b),
which provides:
The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this
section from(1) a transferee that takes for value, including
satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in
good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the
transfer avoided ....
It should be apparent, however, that C, never qualifies for this
defense, since C, always knows that D's conveyance to Xis voidable
if a bankruptcy proceeding ensues in a timely fashion. Therefore,
Cj's lien can never stand. There is no need for the fiction that D
retains an interest in property even after she conveys the fee simple
to X in a voidable transaction.

68. This was the result in Marquette Bank Ill. v. Covey (In re Classic Coach Interiors,
Inc.), 290 B.R. 631 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2002), an exceptionally well-reasoned opinion.

2003]

LOGICAL STRUCTURE

The court in Cullen Center Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In re
Criswell)69 faced precisely these issues but had to rely on
unnecessary fictions to obtain the right result. The Criswell court
ruled that X's property was really D's property. D supposedly had
some sort of equity interest in it, even after conveying it to X. For
this reason, C,'s alleged judicial lien on X's property was really a
lien on D's property-hence a voidable preference.70 Similarly, this
fiction allowed the Criswell court to rule that C, was the initial
transferee of D-not the transferee of X. The lower court had
refused summary judgment because it thought C, had raised a
triable issue of fact on whether it was a good faith transferee or a
transferee "'without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer
avoided."71 The Criswell court was therefore able to impose a
summary judgment on C1 , but in truth C1 was a transferee of a
transferee. Even so, summary judgment was appropriately imposed
on C, as transferee of a transferee. How could C, be a bona fide
transferee, when C,'s own theory was that D had made a fraudulent
transfer to X? Summary judgment could have been awarded, even
without the unbelievable fictions, since an avoiding creditor (C,)
obviously has knowledge of the voidability of D's conveyance.
These same issues may have been present in American National
Bank V. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.),72
where D conveyed property to X more than a year before bankruptcy. One month prior to the bankruptcy petition, C1 commenced
an action against X to recover a fraudulent transfer. This should
have made C1 a secured creditor under Texas law.7" A Chapter 7
69. 102 F.3d 1411, 1417-18 (5th Cir. 1997).
70. In Criswell, C, filed a transcript of a Texas judgment against D (but not against X).

Id. at 1413. No Metcalf-style action against X had been commenced by C. C,, another
creditor, had commenced one but apparently agreed that the trustee could take the proceeds
of it for the bankruptcy estate.

The Criswell court wondered whether C1 had a lien at all on X's real property, but relied
on the fiction that D still had an equitable interest in the real property, even after it was
conveyed toX. Docketing against D was therefore docketing againstX, because D (notX) was
the real owner of the property. Id. at 1417. Because this occurred within the preference

period, C, was guilty of voidable preference.
71. Id. at 1418.
72. 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983).
73. See, e.g., Cassaday v. Anderson, 53 Tex. 527, 537 (1880) ("As between two creditors,

if one has already obtained his judgment and instituted proceedings to set aside the
fraudulent conveyance, this will give him priority of right to first have his debt satisfied out
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trustee then claimed that bankruptcy's automatic stay enjoined C,
from pursuing X.
So far as it went, even if C1 had a valid lien on X's thing, C, was
subject to the automatic stay, provided X's equity in the thing was
property of D's bankruptcy estate.7 4 Certainly X's thing was
property of the estate, since the trustee could avoid D's conveyance
to X by subrogating himself to C2 or some other creditor of D. But
was C, a secured creditor in D's bankruptcy? The answer is no,
since C, was the transferee
of a transferee of the fraudulently
5
thing.1
transferred
The reasoning in MortgageAmerica,however, was quite different.
Basically, the MortgageAmericacourt, overlooking C,'s lien, brought
X's thing into the bankruptcy estate on a rescission theory of
fraudulent transfers:
of the property ..... ). C, had previously obtained a judgment against D. See MortgageAmerica
Corp. v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 651 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App. 1983) (upholding jury verdict).
74. Section 362(aX4) enjoins "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(aX4) (2000).
75. One quite confusing issue inMortgageAmericawas whetherXeven had a thing. The
MortgageAmericaopinion indicates that the thing fraudulently transferred to X were cash
payments, presumably checks. If these checks could be traced to X's bank account, perhaps
X had a thing under the usual tracing rules. But it is also possible that X dissipated these
trust funds in an untraceable way. If so, then C, had a merely in personam right against X
sounding in the tort of conversion.
Nevertheless, C, should be seen as a secured creditor in D's bankruptcy. The collateral is
X's obligation to C,4. To see why, suppose D conveys $50 to X in a fraudulent transfer.
Suppose further that C,, each claim $100 against D and each has fraudulent transfer rights
against X's $50. X has effectively embezzled the trust funds, however. Suppose on Monday
C, brings a law suit against X. Suppose C2 brings a law suit on Tuesday: SurelyX should pay
$50 only once. To whom shall X pay-C, or C ? I maintain that X should pay C, because C,
filed the first complaint. At this point, X's personal liability was in custodia legis for the
benefit of C,. This proves that C, is a secured creditor in X's bankruptcy. In effect, C, has a
lien on property X holds in trust for C,,.
For those who disagree with this judgment, suppose neither C, nor C, has filed against X.
Rather, D files for bankruptcy more than one year after the fraudulent transfer. Accordingly,
the bankruptcy trustee cannot sue X under § 548(a). 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2000). The trustee
must then rely on the subrogation principle in § 544(bX 1). Yet § 544(bX1) provides that "the
trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property ... that is voidable
under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim." 11 U.S.C. § 544(bX1) (2000).
If you think the bankruptcy trustee can sue X in personam under § 544(bX1), then X's in
personam obligation for conversion must be a thing that is "voidable under applicable law."
If, on the other hand, you think that the trustee cannot pursue X in personam under §
544(bX 1), then the result in MortgageAmericais wrong for a different reason. If the trustee
cannot pursue X at all, C, is not violating the automatic stay because C, and the trustee are
not in conflict.
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An action under the Fraudulent Transfers Act is essentially
one for property that properly belongs to the debtor and which
the debtor has fraudulently transferred in an effort to put it out
of the reach of creditors. The transferee may have colorable title
to the property, but the equitable interest-at least as far as the
creditors (but not the debtor) are concerned-is considered to
remain in the debtor so that creditors may attach or execute
judgment upon it as though the debtor had never transferred it.
We think that when such a debtor is forced into bankruptcy, it
makes the most sense to consider the debtor as continuing to
have a "legal or equitable interest[]" in the property fraudulently transferred within the meaning of section 541(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.76
Under the court's rescission theory, X's thing was really D's thing.
Therefore, X's thing entered the bankruptcy estate under § 541,
which defines the bankruptcy estate as "[a] l l interests of the debtor
... as of the commencement of the case."77 Yet the MortgageAmerica
court was also driven to admit that the thing was D's only insofar
as the creditors were concerned. Insofar as D was concerned, the
thing belonged to X. This is tantamount to confessing that D had no
remaining property right in what D fraudulently conveyed. Rather,
after D's conveyance, the thing belonged solely to X (who owned the
surplus in the thing), to C1 (who had a lien on the thing), and to any
7
other creditors of D with fraudulent transfer rights against X. M
The recent case of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v.
Chinery (In re Cybergenics Corp.) (CybergenicsI) 7' dispenses with
the fictions relied upon in Criswell and MortgageAmerica. In
Cybergenics I, a debtor-in-possession sold all its assets under
76. MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d at 1275 (citation omitted).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 541(aX2) (2000).
78. For a case holding that the thing belongs to X until the trustee actually recovers it,
see FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 130-32 (2d Cir. 1992). The

MortgageAmericacourt more plausibly characterized a trust fund theory as property of the
debtor prior to bankruptcy. It reasoned that such a cause of action could be brought by a
creditor or a shareholder, but it must be brought for both groups as a whole. Individual

remedies did not exist. Since the action was one that unified both the creditors and the
shareholders, and since the very personhood of the corporate debtor was this unity, the
action should be viewed as belonging to the unity-that is, to the debtor. MortgageAmerica,
714 F.2d at 1269-72.
79. 226 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2000).
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Bankruptcy Code § 363(b). Both the sales contract and the court
order authorizing it "referred to the sale of all assets of Cybergenics
as debtor and debtor in possession." 0 The Cybergenics I court
correctly emphasized that, under New Jersey law, the fraudulent
transfer right belonged to the creditors, not to the debtor. It then
supposedly followed that the sale of "all assets of [the] debtor-inpossession" did not include the sale of fraudulent transfer claims.
The Cybergenics I court remarked that the debtor-in-possession
might have assigned fraudulent transfer rights, with court
permission. But apparently no such assignment was intended."1
Nevertheless, there are some confusing passages in this opinion.
According to the CybergenicsI court, "the avoidance powers [do not]
shift ownership of the fraudulent transfer action to the debtor in
possession

.

How can this be so? Unless the debtor-in-

possession owns this cause of action (as a fiduciary for the
unsecureds), how could the debtor-in-possession ever sell the
fraudulent transfer action to anyone, as the Cybergenics I court
clearly acknowledged to be possible?" Nevertheless, in pointing
out that, after D fraudulently transfers to X, D owns nothing,
Cybergenics I is obviously correct. What Cybergenics I should be
read as establishing is that, when a bankruptcy trustee or debtorin-possession sells assets, the sale presumptively does not
80. Id. at 241.
81. Still, the sale order did refer to the sale of debtor-in-possessionassets. This quite
plausibly could include all avoidance actions owned as trustee for the unsecured creditor. The
very bankruptcy court that issued the sale order thought so. The appellate panel in
Cybergenics I somehow had better insight into the intent of the bankruptcy court than the
bankruptcy court itself had!
82. Cybergenics Corp., 226 F.3d at 244.
83. This aspect of Cybergenics I has already spawned trouble. In In re PWS Holding
Corp., 303 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 2002), a trustee became subrogated to fraudulent transfer claims
of C, and others. The Chapter 11 plan then took the trouble to prohibit any attempted
enforcement of fraudulent transfer theories. This was a highly problematic term ofthe plan.
Properly, if the debtor-in-possession did not wish to enforce the fraudulent transfer claims,
they should have been abandoned back to C,. Ci's theory was that, under Cybergenics I, the
fraudulent transfer claims belonged to the creditors, not to the debtor-in-possession. The
PWS court ruled that, while the debtor-in-possession did not "own* the fraudulent transfer
claims, it had power to enforce them, and if it chose to benefit Xby extinguishing them, this
was within the competence of the debtor-in-possession to do.
Any distinction between ownership by a fiduciary and power over trust property, however,
is purely formal. The legal ownership of a fiduciary and its power over the equitable interests
in property are the same thing.
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encompass the sale of avoidance actions, unless the court order says
so expressly. 8
To summarize, then, fraudulent transfer law is quite confused as
to its basic concept. Does it stand for the proposition that fraudulent transfer law rescindsa transfer from D to X? Or does it stand
for the proposition that D has alienated the thing, but X holds the
thing in trust for those creditors of D with a fraudulent transfer
right? Clearly the latter view is the more realistic description.
2. ObligationIs Annulled
Fraudulent transfer law famously avoids transfers of property
interests. More mysteriously, it also permits the annulment of D's
in personam obligations. According to Section 9 of the UFCA,
"[wihere [an] obligationis fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor,
when his claim has matured, may... have the ... obligationannulled

to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim.' If the analysis of the
plain vanilla fraudulent transfer is confusing, the analysis of
annulling claims is especially underdeveloped, because annulment
of D's obligation serves no purpose, unless it is also accompanied by
property transfers from D to X.
To see why, suppose D owes X an obligation which is fraudulently
created. X's claim is strictly in personam. At state law, what does
C, even gain by having X's claim declared null and void? C,'s
problem is that C, cannot locate any leviable assets. A judicial
declaration that X has no claim produces nothing leviable for C,.
84. CybergenicsI has gone on to engender a celebrated en banc opinion. Official Comm.

of Unsecured Creditors v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003) (CybergenicsIII), reu'g 304
F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2002) (Cybergenics 11). After the Cybergenics I court concluded that the
fraudulent transfer causes of action still belonged to the bankruptcy estate, a creditors'
committee sought standing to bring them, since the debtor-in-possession declined to do so.
This was granted by the bankruptcy court, but reversed by the district court and the
Cybergenics 1 court. The Cybergenics III court reversed again, allowing the creditors'
committee standing. That creditors' committees have standing is obvious, except that the
Supreme Court, in HartfordUnderwritersInsuranceCo. v. Union PlantersBank, NA., 503
U.S. 249 (2000), issued a regrettable opinion superficially implying that, where the
Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee standing, this can never be assigned to some non-trustee.
A careful reading of HartfordInsurancedefeats this implication, however. See David Gray
Carlson, Surchargeand Standing:Bankruptcy Code § 506(c) after Hartford Underwriters,
75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43, 56-61 (2002).
85. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 198 (1999) (emphasis added).
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In contrast, when D conveys a thing to X, the thing becomes a
leviable asset. If C, is the first to place a lien against it, then C1 has
something of value. But X's purely in personam right against X is
no asset of D. From D's perspective, it is the opposite of property;
it is D's liability.
Without more, annulment of X's obligation is
86
useless to C,.

Annulment becomes analytically necessary, however, when the
fraudulent obligation yields a payment or other transfer secures it.
Such a necessity can arise in a variety of contexts."7

86. According to one court:

It is the rare and exceptional case where a judgment creditor who has been
frustrated in his efforts to collect his judgment will again sue that debtor in a
further effort to collect the same debt. Generally, it would be a futile gesture,
as the creditor already has what he would hope to gain by the suit, namely, a
judgment. And there would be little reason to believe that he could obtain
satisfaction of the second judgment where he had failed in regard to the first.
However, the fact that such a procedure is for very good reason seldom initiated
neither means nor implies that it may not be done.
James v. Powell, 266 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248 (App. Div. 1966).
In Posnerv. S. Paul Posner 1976 Irrevocable Family Trust, 688 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div.
1999), D confessed a judgment in favor of X, and X then sought to enforce it. C, sought
permission to intervene on the theory that the judgment was a fraudulent transfer.
Permission to intervene was granted, on the ground of fraudulent transfer law. Id. at 549.
But, upon intervening, what could C, achieve?
The proper answer is that, since fraudulent transfer transfers and does not annul claims,
C, should now own the confessed judgment. Stepping into X's shoes, C1 should be able to do
whatever X could have done. The Posnercourt, however, never reached these issues. It had
fulfilled its task when it merely gave permission for C1 to intervene in order to prove that the
judgment was a fraudulent transfer. In all likelihood, however, the most C, could have
received, in effect, was injunctive relief against X or D preventing the enforcement or
payment of the debt.
87. Insofar as.mortgages and security interests are concerned, it is possible that the
obligation is honest but the security interest is fraudulent. In FirstNational Bank v. Hooper,
48 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App. 2001), for example, D owed X for a valid loan. C1 obtained a
judgment, but before an abstract could be filed to create a lien on D's real estate, D granted
a mortgage to X on antecedent debt. Here, the obligation was valid but the mortgage was
deemed fraudulent, as it was intended to hinder, delay, or defraud C,. Id. at 805.
There are some very strange aspects to this case, however. The case was litigated under
the UFTA, where C, is entitled to a money judgment against X for the value of the property
conveyed. X's valid obligation was for $400,000. X bid in $247,900. The real estate was
deemed by a jury worth $700,000. If the court was really striking down the mortgage, then
the liability should have been capped at $400,000. If the fault was paying too little at the
foreclosure sale, then liability should have been the value of D's equity only ($452,100). All
we really learn from the court is that the jury could plausibly impose a $700,000 liability. Id.
at 811. The theory upholding this finding, however, is opaque.
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a. Collective Proceedings
Suppose X has a claim that D actually owes. The obligation,
however, is a fraud on creditors. If D is bankrupt, X's claim
engenders a bankruptcy dividend. In the abstract, annulment ofX's
claim was useless. But now proceeds of the voidable claim-the
bankruptcy dividend-represent a leviable asset. If C, annuls X's
claim, C, wins X's bankruptcy dividend.
To spell out how this might work, suppose C14 and X each claim
$100 against D. By the time the bankruptcy proceeding has started,
C, has already obtained a judicial lien on X's claim because it was
a fraudulent transfer."8 C2 .4 have no fraudulent conveyance rights
for some reason. Nor can the trustee avoid X's obligation under
§ 548(a), as it is over one year old at the time of the bankruptcy.
Suppose further that a bankruptcy estate is worth $375, so that it
yields a dividend of 75 cents on the dollar.
On these numbers, if a court were to accept the analysis proffered
here, the bankruptcy trustee should allocate $75 to C, on C,'s
original claim. This should be done without any reference to
fraudulent conveyance law. C, now has a deficit of $25. X is also a
creditor of D. The trustee should also allocate $75 to X's claim. But
C, is now the owner of X's claim, by virtue of C1 's lien on it. C
therefore should receive $25 of X's dividend. A surplus of $50 still
remains from X's $75 dividend, and this should be returned to X. 9
Meanwhile, C2 4 receive $75 apiece from the trustee. They should
be neither helped nor harmed by C1's right against X. X should
receive the surplus, not C2 4 .

88. If C, does not have a judicial lien on X's claim, then C, is merely an unsecured
creditor to whom the trustee is subrogated. Under the rule of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4
(1931), the trustee takes over C,'s recovery and distributes it to all the creditors equally. See
discussion infra Part I.B.3. On the other hand, if C, has already liened X's property, C,
retains the fruit ofher fraudulent transfer theory. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying
text.
89. If the bankruptcy trustee has a § 548(a) theory against X, then X would not get the
surplus. If, however, X's fraudulent transfer is more than one year old at the time of the
bankruptcy petition and if C,, have no fraudulent transfer rights under state law to which
the trustee could subrogate, then X could retain the surplus.
Notice that Moore does not bringX's surplus into the bankruptcy estate. The trustee must
subrogate herself to a real unsecuredcreditorwith a fraudulent transfer right. C2. , however,
have no right. And C, is a secured creditor.
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If, on the other hand, annulment means rescission or general
disallowance, then X loses the surplus. C2A, who ex hypothesi have
no fraudulent transfer right, gain a windfall at X's expense. Using
the above numbers, C2 4 obtain $93.75, when they should have

received $75. The only creditor with fraudulent transfer rightsC 1-also obtains $93.75, when she should have received $100.
Meanwhile, X, who should have received a $50 surplus, loses it all
to C 1-.

This example proves that, just as the language of the fraudulent
transfer statutes with regard to property transfers was misleading,
so it is misleading with regard to the creation of fraudulent
obligations. In fact, X's obligation is not annulled. Properly, it is
transferredto C1 .
Notice that, according to the UFCA, C1 may annul a claim, but
only to the extent necessary to satisfy C1's claim.9" In the above
example, C, and X each claimed $100. C, was entitled to a dividend
of $75 without any reference to fraudulent transfer law. C, was
therefore entitled to annul only $25 of X's claim. Annulment in the
ordinary sense of erasure would benefit mostly those creditors with
no fraudulent transfer rights.
b. Judgments and Res Judicata
Another important utility for obligation annulment is the
destruction of res judicata-an essential concept when D
fraudulently confesses judgment to X, based on a fictitious or
otherwise defective debt. Prior to the judgment, there is no sense in
saying that a fictional debt is a fraudulent transfer. It is simpler to
say that X has no claim. The matter changes once X obtains a
judgment against D. The judgment establishes res judicata against
D, who thereafter can no longer claim that X's obligation is a fiction.
At this point, it becomes necessary for C1 to show that D's obligation
is a fraudulent transfer. 91
Judgments, of course, engender liens. Once X has a lien on D's
property, X has a thing that C, can levy. But C, can reach this lien
only if the underlying obligation is annulled. If the obligation is
90. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(a), 7A U.L.A. 198 (1999).
91. Chandler v. Thompson, 120 F. 940, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1902).
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valid, so is the judicial lien, since antecedent debt is always
"reasonably equivalent value," in UFTA terms.92
An illustrative case is Newman v. FirstNational Bank of East
Rutherford.9" In Newman, X (a bank) held D's promissory note for
$3000. C, was a creditor for $75,000 whom D wished to "hinder,
delay, or defraud."94 D and X agreed that D would execute a new
promissory note for $6500, though X did not advance any new
funds.9" A month later, the note was due and D defaulted. X sued
and obtained a judgment. Pursuant to this judgment, X obtained a
judicial lien on D's property. At the execution sale, X bought
property worth $58,000 by bidding in only $1500 of his judgment.
Apparently, D andXhad a side deal. Xwas supposed to give back
the land to D once the coast was clear and D had paid back the
legitimate $3000 loan to X." X, however, reneged on the deal.
Angry, D exposed the conspiracy to C,. C, brought a creditor's bill
in equity97 against X in order to have the judgment and the sale
proclaimed a fraudulent transfer. The court accorded C, the remedy
it sought:

We find [X's] judgment wholly void. Therefore, the whole of it
should be set aside. Setting aside only the more vicious part (the
$3,500 sham loan) is not enough. It was the act of X] in
92. UNri. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3, 7A U.L.A. 295 (1999).
93. 76 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1935).
94. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 113 (1999).
95. The purpose ofthis was to discourage any other bidders from bidding againstXat the
foreclosure sale. Newman, 76 F.2d at 349. To be absolutely precise, D's pro.missory note bore

the amount $7000. $4000 was placed into a bank account for the benefit of D's son. X
permitted a withdrawal of $500 from the son's account. In any case, the court went on to
treat X's claim as one for $6500, $3000 of which related to a genuine loan, and $3500 related
to a purely fictitious loan. Id.
96. The statute of frauds would have prevented D from claiming an equitable interest in
the real estate, since the contract was not in writing. If this "contract" were enforceable, C,,
would not require fraudulent transfer law to reach X's land. The doctrine of equitable
conversion independently established D as the owner of the real estate, and C,, could reach
this equity through a creditor's bill in equity.
97. Newman, 76 F.2d at 347-50. A creditor's bill in equity was an ancient equity form,
which a creditor could use if the legal remedy of execution did not suffice. It was a popular
means of pursuing property fraudulently conveyed to X. See United States v. Kensington
Shipyard & Drydock Corp., 187 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1951). In a fraudulent transfer case,
filing a creditor's bill in equity establishes a lien for C, onX's property. See Metcalf v. Barker,
187 U.S. 165, 172 (1902).
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obtaining the judgment by fraud not the amount of the
judgment that defeated [C,] recovering on its judgment."

As a remedy, the court ordered a sale of X's property. 99 The
proceeds of the sale were to be distributed to court costs, taxes, X
(for the amount of taxes paid and repairs made), C1 , and then to X
(but only for $3000). Any further surplus was to be held by the court
°
and disposed of in some undetermined way.'
To what extent did the Newman court annul an obligation and to
what extent did it avoid transfers of property? Before the judgment,
there was no fraudulent transfer at all-only fictional debt that D
did not owe. But once the judgment for $6500 was entered, D owed
a fraudulent obligation. Under principles of res judicata, D could no
longer dispute the existence of a $6500 claim. C,, however, could
and did obtain a declaration that X's obligation should be annulled
as a fraudulent transfer. 101
That D owed a fraudulent obligation was initially of no concern
to C,. But once X's judgment was docketed, the matter changed.
Under New Jersey law, a money judgment engenders a lien on real
estate "from the time of the actual entry of such judgment on the
98. Newman, 76 F.2d at 350-51.
99. Id. at 351.
100. Id.
101. Id. Notice that the false loan infected the valid part of the loan, making the whole
judgment invalid. This was justified because the UFCA defines fair consideration as
consideration paid in good faith. The antecedent debt of $3000 was paid (by X to D in good
faith), but it was replaced by a new promissory note in bad faith. See Furlong v. Stortch, 518
N.Y.S.2d 216, 217-18 (App. Div. 1987).
Total avoidance seems to have been required prior to the UFCA. According to Frank
Kennedy, the UFCA's chief contribution is (1) to provide that fraudulent transfers might be
only partially voidable, and (2) to permit creditors without judgments to bring fraudulent
transfer proceedings prior to judgment. Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent
Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 540-41 (1987).
What would have happened if the judgment was only partially avoided? One answer might
be that X and C, are partners. The lien is held by X with 46% for the benefit of C, and 54%
for itself; accordingly, the proceeds purchased from bidding in the lien are split on the same
basis. Alternatively, the entire judgment can be viewed as fraudulent, but X purchased the
judgment with a valid $3000 claim. This purchase would entitle X to claim the lien provided
for in UFCA § 9(2): "A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than
a fair consideration for the conveyance or obligation, may retain the property or obligation
as security for repayment." UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(2), 7A U.L.A. 199
(1999). This provision would permit X to obtain $3000 back from the sale of the real estate
on a basis senior to the judicial lien of C,.
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minutes or records of the court." 10 2 Lien creation is a mode of
transferring property. 0 3 Was this lien a fraudulent transfer? That
depends on what annulment means. If annulment means erasure,
then the case became one in which C1 must avoid the lien because
it was a fraudulent transfer. On this assumption, the attendant lien
constituted a "donation'-a transfer for no fair consideration at a
time when D is insolvent. If the lien had secured a valid debt, it
would be a transfer for
fair consideration, because securing old debt
0
4
'
value.
is considered
Annulment, however, does not mean erasure. It means that C,
became the assignee of X's judgment. So conceived, the judicial lien
is the proceeds of C,'s judgment. No avoidance of the lien occurs.
Rather, the lien belongs to C, on a standard proceeds theory, an
ordinary incident of trust law. 0 5 Therefore, obligation avoidance
was crucial to the outcome of the case. As a result of avoidance, the
judgment was transferredto C1 , not annulled. C1 became owner of
the lien on a proceeds theory.
But something else must be added in order to justify the
conclusion that C,'s lien attached to the fee simple of X's real
property. Separate and apart from the fraudulent obligation, the
foreclosure sale itself constituted a fraudulent transfer, because X
paid too little for D's equity.
Let's pay very close attention to the effect of this foreclosure sale.
In a foreclosure sale, X (as lien creditor) and D sell their respective
interest to X (as buyer). These interests merge to make X (as buyer)
the owner of a fee simple estate. 0 6 Notice that X's fee simple estate
consists of two parts: (1) X's lien, which is held in trust for C as
proceeds of a fraudulent judgment, and (2) D's equity. D's equity is
not proceeds of X's fraudulent judgment. If C, is to have X's equity
as well as X's lien, C must have a new and separate fraudulent
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A 16-1 (West 2000).
103. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 1, 7A U.L.A. 6 (1999).
104. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. 32 (1999).
105. Rabin v. Delacruz (In re St. Clair Clinic, Inc.), No. 94-3943, 1996 WL 6531, at **3-4
(6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1996) (finding that fraudulently conveyed funds were used to purchase real
property belonging to defendant, and were therefore part of the bankruptcy estate).
106. X's interest was subject to some senior mortgage unaffected by C1 's litigation. For a
time, it was denied that the foreclosure sale was a transfer at all, but, of course, the sale
constitutes the transfer of a potentially valuable debtor equity to a buyer at the sale. See
Kennedy, supra note 100, at 554-59.
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transfer theory that applies only to the sale of the equity. In other
words, the fraudulent transfer ofD's equity has nothing whatsoever
to do with avoidance of the fraudulent obligation.
Why can we not say that X's equity is the proceeds of the
fraudulent judgment? To see why, imagine that a good faith
purchaser (Y) shows up at the auction and outbids X by bidding
$6501. Assuming transaction costs are zero, these proceeds are
allocable to X, as constructive trustee for C 1,'0 7 with one dollar going
to D. When Y is the bidder, Y buys the judicial lien from X for a
reasonably equivalent value and the equity from D, for one dollar.
These two interests-Xs lien and D's equity-merge to form Y's fee
simple absolute. With regard to X's lien, this was held in trust for
C,. Nevertheless, as a bona fide purchaser, Ybuys it free and clear
of the constructive trust. The $6500 X received is the proceeds of
the lien held for the benefit of C,. The matter is different with
regard to debtor equity. Y is the initial transferee of D's equity. So
conceived, this equity is not the proceeds of a fraudulent transfer.
Rather, Y's purchase must be separately scrutinized to determine
whether it is a fraudulent transfer.
Can underpaying at a foreclosure sale constitute a fraudulent
transfer? This was the issue in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,'
where the Supreme Court held that whatever a buyer pays at a
foreclosure sale is always a reasonably equivalent value. This
holding is not necessarily binding in state law; BFP is an
interpretation of the phrase "reasonably equivalent value," as that
phrase appears in Bankruptcy Code § 548(a).'" The UFTA,
however, legislated the BFP holding in advance. According to
UFTA § 3(b), "a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if
the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale .... ""0
Nevertheless, under the UFCA, it is still open for C, to recover

107. Courts are willingto proclaimXa constructive trustee for C1 as a general proposition.
See Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 206,215 (3d Cir. 1990);
Hoult v. Hoult, No. Civ. A 88-1738-DPW, 2002 WL 1009378, at **29-31 (D. Mass. May 13,
2002); SEC v. Antar, 120 F. Supp. 2d 431, 448-49 (D.N.J. 2000).

108. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
109. Id. at 535.
110. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. 295 (1999).
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debtor equity from Y, if Y did not pay fair consideration for debtor
equity.
If, per the BFPcase, Y paid consideration for debtor equity when
she paid $1 for it, then is it not the case that X is likewise off the
hook, when X bids in the judgment? Not necessarily; BFPcontains
a collusion exception. According to the BFP Court: "Although
collusive foreclosure sales are likely subject to attack under
§ 548(a)(1), which authorizes the trustee to avoid transfers 'made
... with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud' creditors, that
provision may not reach foreclosure sales that, while not intentionally fraudulent, nevertheless fail to comply with all governing
state laws.""' Perhaps because X colluded with D, the BFPholding
no longer applies,2 and it is now permissible for C1 to reach X's
equity interest."
At the foreclosure sale, then, something new emerged. Before
that point, D (not X) owned the equity interest in the fee simple
estate. By virtue of the judicial lien, X was empowered to sell D's
property interest to a buyer who also happened to be X. In effect, D,
regardless of his consent, was forced to convey his valuable equity
interest to X for nothing-a transfer for no fair consideration while
D was insolvent.
The entire fee simple estate ofX, then, was a fraudulent transfer.
Part of the fee simple stemmed from annulment of an obligation.
Part of it-the transfer of debtor equity to X-did not stem from
annulment of the obligation and perhaps was voidable even if the
judgment was totally valid. As a result of these two distinct acts of
avoidance or annulment, X's land was held in trust for C1 , pending
C 1's affixation of its private judicial lien on X's property. Annulment
of the obligation was necessary, but not sufficient, for this result.
111. BFP,511 U.S. at 545.
112. It is beyond the scope of the current Article, but it should be noted that "collusion"
is a deeply troublesome concept. IfD and X collude in a foreclosure sale, but they follow the
procedural rules, does notXpay a reasonably equivalentvalue all the same, relying onBFPs
logic? For a recent example of collusion, see Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel
Corp., 919 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1990). In Voest-Alpine, D defaulted on a mortgage agreement
withX. AtX's foreclosure sale, Ywas the buyer. Y financed the purchase with a secured loan
from X. The shareholder of Y was also the shareholder of D. Precisely where was the
collusion here? Did D, who was insolvent, collude by defaulting? Did X collude by lending to
Y? What was wrong with this transaction, given that Y paid "reasonably equivalent value"
per BFP?
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c. Secured Obligations
Annulment of obligations again plays a confusing role in cases
where D also grants X a security interest or mortgage for the
fraudulent obligation. Are these fraudulent transfers of property or
the fraudulent creation of an obligation?
As before, the borderline between fictional debt and fraudulent
obligation is hard to theorize. In the case of purely fictional debts,
there is no need for a fraudulent transfer theory, because D owes
nothing. If D owes nothing, then no security interest can attach to
D's property." 3 If, on the other hand, Xhas a claim against D which
is fraudulent as to C1 , the attendant security interest exists as
such. Whether C, can become subrogated to X's security interest
often depends on annulment of the obligation. Once annulled, the
obligation belongs to C1, and the security interest for the obligation
must follow along.
Dean Robert Charles Clark, however, presents the following
example of a mortgage based in part on real advances and part on
pure fiction:
Debtor [D] grants [X] a mortgage of his small factory in return
for a loan of $160,000, which [W1 actually makes to [D]. [D],
wishing to discourage unpaid trade creditors having $30,000 of
claims from litigating them to judgment and seeking execution
against the factory, prevails upon I1 to have the recorded
mortgage recite that it secures a debt for $200,000 .... The trade

creditors' attorneys search the real estate records, discover and
give credence to the false mortgage, and, knowing that [D] has
few assets other
than the factory, become discouraged and cease
114
pursuing [D].

In Clark's example, $40,000 of the mortgage is entirely fictional.
This, Clark says, "is a case of Ur-Fraud, that primeval fraud on
creditors than which no greater can be thought."" 5
113. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) makes extension of value an element of
attachment (that is to say, of lien creation). U.C.C. § 9-203(bXl) (2001).
114. Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 505, 508-09 (1977).
115. Id. at 509. Theologians will detect here a sly reference to St. Anselm's ontological
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It is possible that Clark's fraud is no fraud at all. In his example,
is the fraud the secured obligation or the mortgage lien (a transfer
of the property)? It is hard to say because a mortgage is always the
qualitative power to sell D's fee simple in the property. So long as
one dollar of valid obligation exists, the mortgage as such is valid.
What is really at issue in Clark's example is the quantitativeaspect
of the mortgage, which determines how much of the proceeds X can
validly keep following the sale.
It is not clear in Dean Clark'sexample that C, needs a fraudulent
11 6
transfer theory to reach D's equity. In New York, for example, C.4
could seek declaratory relief under New York Civil Practice Law
Rule 5239, which provides: "Prior to the application of property or
debt by a sheriff or receiver to the satisfaction of a judgment, any
interested person may commence a special proceeding against the
judgment creditor or other person with whom a dispute exists to
determine rights in the property or debt."'1 7 Using this provision
-without any reference to fraudulent transfer law-Cl-4 can obtain
any surplus above $160,000. Perhaps Clark's Ur-Fraud is no fraudulent transfer law at all!
The point has practical import. If Dean Clark has given us a true
fraudulent transfer case, then CiA are subject to the fraudulent
transfer statute of limitations, which at least in New York is
basically six years."8 If, on the other hand, this is not a fraudulent
transfer example, Ci can reach D's equity so long as their
judgments are still valid. In New York, judgments are good for
twenty years, 1 9 and they are perpetually renewable. 20
The matter changes ifX obtains a judgment of foreclosure based
on the fictional debt. In that case, D is bound by res judicata. X's
claim then graduates from mere fiction to a fraudulent transfer. At
proof of God. ST. ANSELM, MONOLOGION AND PROSLOGION WITH THE REPLY OF GAUNILO AND

ANSELM 100 (Thomas Williams trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1996).
116. Since Clark's mortgage is an intentional fraud on creditors, both present and future
creditors have fraudulent transfer rights, if indeed Clark has given us a true fraudulent
transfer case.
117. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239 (McKinney 1997).
118. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(1) (McKinney 1990). When the fraudulent transfer is an intentional
fraud, then C, has six years or two years after discovery, whichever lasts longer. See Wall St.
Assocs. v. Brodsky, 684 N.Y.S.2d 244, 248 (App. Div. 1999).
119. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 211(b) (McKinney 1990).
120. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5014 (McKinney 1992).
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this point, C1, 4 need fraudulent transfer theory to establish that
the real debt is $160,000-not $200,000. In BSL Development
Corp. v. Aquabogue Cove Partners,Inc.,12 1 D issued a mortgage on
antecedent debt to X, an insider, on the eve of C,'s judgment. A
large part ofX's claim was fictional. On this basis, C, was permitted
to intervene in X's foreclosure sale, where C, was fully subrogated
to X's mortgage lien. C's intervention therefore culminated both in
a judgment binding against D and C,'s simultaneous subrogation to
X's mortgage. 122
Mortgages for fictional debts, then, are difficult to analyze. But
clearly when they are intended to hinder or delay specific creditors,
courts are prepared to proclaim them fraudulent transfers. Easier
to analyze are fraudulent obligations when D clearly owes the
mortgage debt.
Leveraged buyouts present the classic example. United States v.
Tabor Court Realty" represents what was earlier called an exchange. D borrowed fromXin exchange for mortgages. Xknew that
some of the money would be used to cash out shareholders and
certainly should have known that, given the extreme drain on cash
flow caused by debt service, D could not long survive. D soon
defaulted on a tax debt (which generated a lien junior to X's
mortgage), and, in a foreclosure sale, a co-conspirator purchased the
collateral for a pittance. The fraudulent transfer remedy sought by
the IRS was aimed at the mortgage and also at the transfer of
debtor equity as a result of the tax foreclosure sale. The nature of
the fraud was a species of exchange for the purpose of financing D's
fraudulent transfer to the departing shareholders.12 4 Mortgages are
a means of liquifying assets so that the dollars can flee the grasp of
unpaid creditors.
In Tabor Court Realty, the debt D owed was not fictional. X
actually advanced funds, and D chose to use the funds to redeem
121. 623 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1995).
122. Id. at 254. To complicate matters, the case might equally be viewed as an insider's
voidable preference, which New York dubs a fraudulent transfer. See HBE Leasing Corp. v.

Frank, 48 F.3d 623 (2d Cir. 1995). If so, then BSL is a fraudulent transfer case, even if the
obligation is totally valid.

123. 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 1291-94. The Tabor court, however, chose to view it as a donation case. It

collapsed the transaction so that, althoughX received a mortgage, D received no funds since
the funds were dividended out to the departing shareholders. Id. at 1302-03.
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common stock. If X had foreclosed on the mortgage, D could not
claim this debt was a mere fiction. Leveraged buyouts are therefore
legitimate fraudulent transfer cases. They turn on annulling the
obligation. The mortgage itself is proceeds of that obligation, and its
expropriation by C, followed accordingly. As always, annulled125does
not mean erased. Rather, it means transferred from X to C,.
3. Moore v. Bay
In the above examples, C1 had fraudulent transfer rights against
X's property, but C2.4 did not. These examples proved that avoidance
and annulment are misleading metaphors that must not be taken
literally. Rather, fraudulent transfer law transfersX's rights over
to C1 (but not to C2 4 ).

126
There is a reason this point has been overlooked: Moore v. Bay.
In effect, Moore v. Bay converts fraudulent transfer theory into
general rescission in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Since 1898, federal bankruptcy has been the dominant mode of
debt collection. The strange rule of Moore v. Bay holds sway here.
This case is an interpretation of what is now § 544(b)(1), which
subrogates the trustee to any avoidance power of an unsecured
creditor. 127 For example, if D conveys a thing to X, and if C, has a
fraudulent transfer right against X's thing, D's bankruptcy implies
that the trustee steps into the shoes of C, in order to recover X's
thing for the bankruptcy estate. 2 '
Moore v. Bay is yet another manifestation of the metaphorical
error caused by terms like "avoid" or "set aside." In Moore v. Bay,
the Supreme Court, in a rare moment of confusion, imagined that
D's transfer to X should be literally set aside in the sense of
erased. 1" What was once D's thing is D's thing once again. The
entire thing is treated as if it had always been in D's estate. X loses
125. In Tabor Realty, D retained about 44% of the LBO loan and only used 56% of it to
redeem shares. Nevertheless, the entire mortgage was held a fraudulent transfer. Id. at
1293. The case therefore resembles Newman v. First NationalBank of EastRutherford, 76
F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1935), in giving the secured creditor no credit for funds actually advanced
and used within the debtor's estate.
126. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 544(bXl) (2001); see also Bankruptcy Act of 1868 § 70(e) (repealed 1978).
128. See In re Classic Coach Interiors, Inc., 290 B.R. 631, 637-40 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2002).
129. Moore, 284 U.S. at 5.
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the surplus because, in effect, there was no transfer to X in the first
place. 130 When Moore v. Bay applies and a surplus in the bankruptcy estate exists, the bankruptcy estate, not X, wins back the
surplus. Moore v. Bay effectively licenses C2 4 to a free ride on C,'s
private right.
Strictly speaking, the trustee may not always need to invoke subrogation. The trustee has her own direct, independent fraudulent
transfer right under § 548(a), regardless of state or nonbankruptcy
law.' 3 ' If the trustee recovers under § 548(a), the proceeds go into
the bankruptcy estate and are shared equally by C1, 4, even if C 2 _4
had no state law rights. C, cannot claim any unique right of
recovery just because C1 also has a private right of recovery under
state law.
But § 548(a) has a stingy one-year statute of limitations.'3 2 If D
conveyed the thing to X one year before bankruptcy, § 548(a) is
useless for recovery of it. State law usually has a longer statute of
limitations. It is usually said that § 544(b)'s principal utility in
modern times is to harness the advantage of the longer statute of
limitations. 133 A key difference between direct recovery under
§ 548(a) and subrogation under § 544(b)(1) is that, for the subrogation theory to work, the trustee must actually identify a real
flesh-and-blood creditor (like C,) who could have avoided the
transfer to X under nonbankruptcy law.114
Without more, subrogation under § 544(b)(1) merely suggests
that the trustee has only what C, had. If X owns a surplus beyond
Cl's claim, this would continue to belong to X, under the logic of
subrogation. Moore v. Bay, however, does violence to subrogation
theory in two ways. First, subrogation, as transformed in Moore,
means the bankruptcy trustee can recover all of X's surplus. For
example, ifX's thing is worth $150 and C,'s claim against D is $100,

130. Id.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2001).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 229 F.3d 245,250-51
(3d Cir. 2000).
134. See, e.g., Liebowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co., 139 F.3d 574, 576-77 (7th Cir.

1998). Under § 544(bXl), the relevant theological principle is transubstantiation,where the
more Protestant § 548(a) operates on a theory of consubstantiation.
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the trustee recovers $150 from X-the entire thing. Second, the
135
proceeds of X's thing belongs to the bankruptcy estate, not to C 1 .
Congress pondered a repeal of Moore v. Bay in 1977 when it
enacted the Bankruptcy Code. Moore was saved from obscurity by
the testimony of Professor Vern Countryman who observed that it
spared bankruptcy trustees the trouble of tracking down and
subrogating to the rights of sufficient creditors to get back all of X's
thing. If C, could be located, the trustee's victory over X was
assured, and estate assets were preserved. For this reason Moore
v. Bay is still with us.13
But Moore v. Bay is an interpretation of § 544(b)(1) only.
Equitable subordination is legislated into existence by Bankruptcy
Code § 510(c). l1 7 It expressly authorizes subordination to specific
creditors, 3 8 which implies that the questionable dynamic of Moore
v. Bay has no purpose there. Accordingly, all the distinctions
developed above about C,'s right (and C 2 4's lack of right) can be
used to analyze the equitable subordination remedy, which is not
subject to the rule of Moore v. Bay. Given the fact that equitable
subordination and fraudulent transfer are the identicalremedy, this
distinction makes no sense.

135. See Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 74950 (1984) (asserting that Moore v. Bay "is unprincipled to the extent that it forces a
particular creditor to share the valuable right to avoid a property interest with the entire
class of unsecured creditors").
136. This story is recounted in Nancy L. Sanborn, Note, Avoidance Recoveries in
Bankruptcy: For the Benefit of the Estate or the Secured Creditor?,90 COLUM. L. REV. 1376,
1381-82 (1990).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2001).
138. See id.
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II. EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION

A. The Substantive Standard
Invented by the Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton,"9 equitable
subordination was eventually codified in Bankruptcy Code § 510(c),
which provides that a court may:
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate
for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all
or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed
interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or
(2)order that any lien securing
such a subordinated claim be
40
transferred to the estate.1

Whereas a fraudulent transfer can be summarized as being either
a deliberate fraud on creditors or a donation,' equitable subordination cannot so neatly be captured. Virtually any inequitable
conduct by a creditor can be used to justify an equitable subordination. The classic formulation of the standard is found in the
oft-cited Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.).

4 2 According

to the Mobile Steel test, equitable subordination is appropriate
if, (1) the claimant engaged in some type of inequitable conduct,"
139. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). A few months before, the Supreme Court decided the famous
"Deep Rock" case that is the staple of corporate finance casebooks. Taylor v. Standard Gas
& Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). In this case, open accounts of a holding company were
transformed into capital contributions and the holding company was reduced to the rank of
common shareholder below preferred shares. The phrase "subordinated" is occasionally used
there, but the notion of subordination as an equitable power of the bankruptcy courts comes
from Pepper. Even Pepper does not use the phrase "equitable subordination" as such, but
equity and subordination are often used in the same sentence. See, e.g., Pepper,308 U.S. at
296 ("We granted certiorari because of an apparent restriction imposed by that decision on
the power of the bankruptcy court to disallow or to subordinate such claims in exercise of its
broad equitable powers.").
It is also possible to fimd cases before Pepperin which the equitable subordination remedy
was imposed on a misbehaving creditor without using the phrase "equitable subordination."
See, e.g., Miller v. Borton (In re Bowman Hardware & Elec. Co.), 67 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1933).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2001).
141. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
142. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
143. One exception to this proposition is that courts are apparently willing to subordinate
debt when it is swapped for stock, if the debt is still outstanding at the time of the
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(2) the conduct caused injury to the creditors or conferred an unfair
advantage on the claimant, and (3) subordination is otherwise
consistent with all the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.14 '
Most often insider creditors are the ones punished by equitable
subordination. Ordinary creditors may likewise be subordinated,145
but it is often said that their conduct must be especially egregious
to justify the remedy.4 Nevertheless, even lawful conduct may
147
constitute egregious conduct justifying equitable subordination.
Although a survey of wicked conduct is beyond the scope of this
Article, a few points deserve emphasis in considering the structure
of the remedy. Whereas fraudulent transfer law concerns itself with
the debtor's intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors (although
intent is presumed in insolvent donation cases), equitable subordination concerns itself with creditor misconduct. Accordingly,
while fraudulent transfer law focuses solely on the origin of X's
claim, equitable subordination "need not ... be specifically related

to the creditor's claim, either in its origin or its acquisition, but it
may equally arise out of any unfairact on the part of the creditor,
which affects the bankruptcy results to other creditors

...

B. The Remedy
What is usually said about equitable subordination is that X's
claim is not disallowed.19 It is merely demoted behind all the other
bankruptcy. See In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 79 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1996); Robinson v.
Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935); see also In re Lifshutz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339,
348 (7th Cir. 1997) (characterizing this doctrine as an exception to the rule that creditor
misconduct must be established for a case of equitable subordination). Contra Audre
Recognition Sys., Inc. v. Casey (In re Audre, Inc.), 210 B.R. 360 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997)
(requiring creditor misconduct in all cases).
144. Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 693.
145. See generally Andrew DeNatale & Prudence Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable
Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW. 517, 519 (1985)
("Where a claimant's conduct in relation to other creditors is contrary to equitable principles,
the equity powers of the bankruptcy court may be exercised to subordinate the claim of that
claimant to the claims of the others of the same class").
146. See, e.g., Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re 604
Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1356 (1st Cir. 1992).
147. See 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank (In re 80 Nassau Assocs.), 169
B.R. 832, 837 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
148. Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., Mishkin v. Siclari (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 277 B.R. 520,563
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creditors and stands in line behind them. 50 Such a description
suffices when X harms all the creditors. In such a case, demotion
produces the same result as assignment. Yet Bankruptcy Code §
510(c) authorizes subordination to less than all of the creditors in
appropriate cases.' 5 ' If equitable subordination means demotion,
then C2 -4 , not harmed by X's malice, receive a windfall. C1, the only

creditor harmed, has a more difficult time getting paid because she
must share with C2,.

The better view of equitable subordination is that it constitutes
the assignment of X's claim to the creditors harmed by X's conduct.
This is precisely what fraudulent transfer law achieves when it
annuls D's obligations. As we have seen, annulment does not mean
disallowance. Rather, it means that X's claim is transferred to C1 .
This insight proves that equitable subordination is simply a
fraudulent transfer remedy.
Because of this insight, Moore v. Bay'52 (itself the product of
metaphorical error) is irrationally limited to fraudulent transfer
cases under § 544(b)(1). Also, the equation of fraudulent transfer
and equitable subordination proves that equitable subordination is
a remedy that can be instituted under state law when appropriate.
As with fraudulent transfer law, fictional debts in bankruptcy
must be distinguished from real-but-fraudulent debts. If a debt is
purely fictional, the proper remedy is to disallow it because it is not
enforceable against D.'" It makes sense to subordinate a claim, or
proclaim it a fraudulent transfer, if and only if it is otherwise
allowable against D. If X's fictional claim is allowed but subordinated, X (not D) would gain any bankruptcy surplus after all
creditors are paid. Yet X has no entitlement against D at all.
Significantly, the very case that invented equitable subordination
was a fictional debt case. In Pepper v. Litton,"4 X obtained a

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The equitable subordination doctrine, codified in part in Section
510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, is limited to reordering priorities; it does not permit
disallowance of claims.').
150. E. Minerals & Chems. Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d 330, 338 (3d Cir. 2000).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2001).
152. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
153. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3007 describes the procedure for claims
objections. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007.
154. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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judgment against D.' 55 Without an avoidance theory, X's fictional
claim had to be allowed as a matter of res judicata.' 56 Equitable
subordination therefore was invented to be and continues to exist
as a reproach to res judicata-a function it shares with fraudulent
transfer law.
In Pepper, the Court permitted complete disallowance of X's
claim, an act the Pepper Court called subordination.'5 7 The
legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code specifically endorses the
disallowance remedy as a mode of equitable subordination.' 58
Properly, however, X's claim should not have been simply avoided
or annulled (i.e., disallowed) but rather transferredto the creditors
harmed by X's action. Disallowance meant that D would get the
surplus, not X. Yet X's claim against D was vested with the dignity
ofresjudicata. An assignment theory, however, would have allowed
X to obtain the surplus in recognition of the fact that X's claim
against D was valid though voidable by creditors.' 5 9 If, on the other
hand, equitable subordination consists of assigningX's claim to
C 1 -exactly what fraudulent transfer law demands-then C2 -4
Id. at 297.
Id. at 302-05.
Id. at 303.
According to the legislative history:
[Section 5101 permits the court to subordinate, on equitable grounds, all or any
part of an allowed claim or interest to all or any part of another allowed claim
or interest, and permits the court to order that any lien securing claims
subordinated under this provision be transferred to the estate. This section is
intended to codify case law, such as Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), and
Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1938), and is not
intended to limit the court's power in any way. The bankruptcy court will
remain a court of equity, proposed 28 U.S.C. 1481; LocalLoan v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 240 (1934). Nor does this subsection preclude a bankruptcy court from
completely disallowing a claim in appropriate circumstances. See Pepper v.
Litton, supra. The court's power is broader than the general doctrine of
equitable subordination and encompasses subordination on any equitable
grounds.
H.R. 595, 95th Cong., § 510 (1979) (emphasis added). For some reason, courts simply
overlook this point. See, e.g., Mishkin v. Siclari (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 277
B.R. 520,563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (-The equitable subordination doctrine, codified in part
in Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, is limited to reordering priorities; it does not
permit disallowance of claims.").
159. In Pepper, it turns out that X was the "dominant and controlling stockholder" of D,
so no harm was done. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 297. As shareholder, he was destined to get any
surplus left after C was paid. But in some future case, that may not be so.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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receive no windfall, C1 is more likely to be paid, and Xis more likely
to receive a surplus.160
The following sections establish that an assignment theory of
equitable subordination is superior to a demotion theory when X's
wicked blows rain upon C,'s shoulders only. Assignment theory
works equally well as demotion when X is generally subordinated
to all creditors. Because assignment theory works better in the unusual case and functions perfectly in the general case, it should be
adopted as the true nature of equitable subordination.
1. Specific Subordination
a. UnderBankruptcy Code § 510(c)
Suppose C1 is the only creditor harmed by X. C 2.4 are unaffected
or perhaps even helped by the wrong visited upon C,. Bankruptcy
Code § 5 10(c) refers directly to the possibility of subordination to C1,
but not to C 2 4 , as it invites a bankruptcy court to "subordinate for
purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all orpart
of anotherallowed claim .... "' Therefore, C1 alone may be entitled
to the benefits of equitable subordination to the exclusion of C2 4 .
What this means is that C, is the assignee ofX's claim. This entitles
160. A rather different view of the matter was presented by Dean Clark in his classic
comparison of fraudulent transfers and equitable subordination. He viewed equitable
subordination to be a "functional equivalent" of fraudulent transfer law. Clark, supra note
12, at 536. Naturally, since fraudulent transfer law is merely an equivalent, it is portrayed
as different from equitable subordination law.
In Clark's example, X is an inside creditor claiming $100. X competes with C, an outside
creditor, claiming $100. D has assets of $150. D then conveys $70 to X in a fraudulent
transfer. Clark then compares recovering the $70 directly from X and equitably
subordinating X's valid claim of $100. See id. at 521-22.
Clark's example prevented him from reaching the conclusion here-that fraudulent
transfer law and equitable subordination are precisely the same thing. If the fraudulent
transfer in Clark's example was the very creation of the $100 claim being asserted byX, then
the exact equivalence of the two areas of law would have revealed itself.
Nevertheless, cases such as the one posed by Clark undoubtedly exist. In In re Thompson,
276 F. 313 (W.D. Pa. 1921), a secured party bought collateral at an obviously too low price
and then made an application to recover cash collateral held by the bankruptcy estate. Id.
at 314-15. The court in effect disallowed the secured party's claim to compensate for the
fraudulent transfer that the secured party received. Id. at 318-19 (noting that "the claimant
here has been already much overpaid").
161. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
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C1 to the dividend that otherwise would have been payable to X. In
effect, C1 obtains double dividends.
By way of example, suppose D has five creditors: C1 4 and X.
Every creditor claims $100. The estate has $375. If X's claim is
simply disallowed or generally subordinated to all other creditors,
then four creditors (C1 and C2 4) obtain one-fourth of $375, or

$93.75. C,, the victim, is not entirely paid, and the neutral creditors
unharmed by X's action obtain a windfall. They would have
obtained $75 from the distribution in the absence of equitable
subordination. Now they receive $93.75. Meanwhile, X's chance for
a surplus becomes more remote as a result of general subordination.
IfX is generally subordinated, X obtains a surplus only if the estate
exceeds $400. Where X is specifically subordinated to C1 only, X
receives a dividend when the estate exceeds $250.
If, however, X is specifically subordinated to C1 only, the matter
changes. Suppose that equitable subordination achieves the
assignmentofX's claim to C1 (but not to C2 4). In this conception, C1
first obtains $75 in her own right. C2 _ also obtain $75. X's claim is
allocated $75, but this dividend is dedicated to C1 until C1 is paid.
C1 therefore obtains $25 of X's dividend, so that C1 receives $100 in
total. X receives the surplus of $50. The neutral creditors are
neither helped nor harmed by the suggested allocation.
The precise result was also achieved when X's claim was deemed
a fraudulent conveyance. Specific subordination, then, is the fraudulent transfer remedy where only C1 is entitled to recover. When X
is subordinated to C1 alone (and not to all the other creditors), C1
obtains a security interest on X's claim. So conceived, equitable
subordination is a theory under which X's property is transferred
from X to C1 .
b. Under Bankruptcy Code § 509
Specific subordination under § 510(c) is no doubt rare, but it is
routinely invoked by Bankruptcy Code § 509, which governs
suretyship claims.1"2 Suppose instead of receiving a fraudulent
transfer from D or visiting wicked havoc on C1 so as to justify
equitable subordination, X instead guarantees Cl's claim for $100.
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 509 (2000).
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Suppose further, as so often happens, D and X are both bankrupt.
C, has already obtained $75 of its $100 claim from X's bankruptcy.
In order to obtain reimbursement, X files a proof of claim in D's
bankruptcy.' X is in part a contingent creditor of D. That is, D
does not owe X until X actually pays C1 and becomes subrogated to
her claim. The Bankruptcy Code, however, disallows the contingent
portion of the claim ($25).'1 The non-contingent portion-the
subrogation right based on paying C, $75-is fully allowable,1 65 but
it is subject to the distributional rule of § 509(c), which provides:
The court shall subordinate to the claim of a creditor and for the
benefit of such creditoran allowed claim, by way of subrogation
under this section, or for reimbursement of contribution, or an
entity that is liable with the debtor on, or that has secured, such
creditor's claim, until such creditor's claim is paid in full, either
through payments under this title or otherwise."
The emphasized language makes clear that only C1 (not C 2 4 ) is to
benefit from X's subordination.
Suppose now that C 2 4 have allowed claims of $100 against D. C1 's
$100 claim has been reduced to $25, andXhas an allowed claim of
$75, because X is subrogated to C,'s right to a dividend in D's
bankruptcy.
Just as C2 4 should receive nothing from the equitable
subordination of X, so they should receive nothing extra because X
is surety to C1 . Rather, the $75 dividend allocable to X should be
allocated to C, (for $25). This allocation is more complex than it
seems. Both C, and X are entitled to dividends in their own right.
Since C 1 claims $25 and X claims $75, their own dividends are
$18.75 and $56.75 respectively. Cl's dividend reduces her claim to
$6.25. X, however, is subordinated to C1 . Since subordination means
assignment off's claim, C, receives $6.25 off's dividend. X retains
$50. As with fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination,
X should receive the surplus, not C 2.4.
163. For ease of exposition, I will refer to X, though X's subrogation rights are property
of X's bankruptcy estate.
164. 11 U.S.C. § 50 2 (eX1) (2000).
165. 11 U.S.C. § 502(eX2) (2000).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 509(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
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The above example makes it possible to conclude that fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination make X the nonrecourse surety of C,, but not of C2 .4 . Fraudulent transfer liability
and equitable subordination are therefore in the nature of noncontractual suretyships, imposed on X by operation of law.
2. General Subordination
When K's dark malice harms C,.4 equally, it suffices to say that
Xis demoted in priority. But it equally suffices to say that X's claim
is assigned to C1,4 as security for their claims. In short, general
subordination is simply a special case of specific subordination.
When X is subordinated to C, (but not to C2 .4), C1 receives double
dividends-her own and (to the extent necessary) X's dividend.
Beyond the amount needed to pay C,, Xhas a surplus interest in X's
original dividend. This same regime works perfectly well to describe
the phenomenon ofgeneral subordination to all creditors. WhereX's
crime is general, not specific, all the creditors receive X's dividend.
In order to illustrate this principle, it is necessary to change the
numerical example so as to produce a surplus for X. Suppose X and
C, 4 each claim $100 and are entitled to a 90% dividend of $90. In
all, there are $500 worth of claims competing for $450 of assets. X
is subordinated to all the creditors.
It is typically said X stands in line16 7 after C,.4, who obtain 100%
dividends, leaving $50 in the bankruptcy estate. X's subordinated
claim of $100 may now receive a $50 dividend. Yet if standing in
line was the theory in the case of specific subordination, neutral
creditors would obtain a windfall, and Xwould be over-punished for
Q
her crime.
On the theory presented here, the procedure for general
subordination is restated (though X still obtains $50). Because
equitable subordination is simply fraudulent transfer law in the
context of pro rata distributions, C 1 _4 obtain a lien onK's $100 claim,
which itself generates a $90 dividend. C,4 therefore are entitled to
double dividends. Each of the four obtains $90 in her own right. The
estate is now reduced by $360, leaving only $90 to distribute. This
equates with the dividend allocable to, but withheld from, X. The
167. See, e.g., E. Minerals & Chems. Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d 330, 338 (3d Cir. 2000).
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four creditors need $40 of X's dividend to be made whole. They
therefore "take" $44.44 of X's claim, which is what is required to
generate a $40 dividend, given the 90% dividend. The bankruptcy
estate is now reduced to $50. X obtains the surplus of $50, based on
her remaining unsecured claim of $55.56. This is the sole remaining
claim against the $50 in the bankruptcy estate. This amount is
allocated to X's $55.56 claim. In effect, X receives a 90% dividend
-just as C14 did-though X's total claim has been reduced by the
amount needed to secure the claims of C, 4 . Although the result is
the same (X obtains $50), under this restated theory of equitable
subordination, X obtains a 90% return both before and after
subordination.
This demonstration shows that general subordination is the same
as specific subordination, and both are the same as what is
misleadingly
called annulment of a fraudulent obligation under
168
state law.

C. ContractualSubordinationCompared
Equitable subordination may be compared to contractual subordination. Although the nature of contractual subordination is
likewise much disputed, it can be said that contractual subordination achieves through consent what equitable subordination
achieves through operation of law, with one important supplement.
Contractual subordination, as I have argued elsewhere, is the
assignment of a junior claim to designated senior creditors as
security for the senior claims. 169 This is quite explicitly described in
the subordination provisions of the Model Indenture,17 which
provide that in case of any liquidation or reorganization of the
debtor:
(a) the holders of all Senior Debt shall first be entitled to
receive payment in full ... before the Holders of the Debentures
... are entitled to receive any payment ...;
(b) any payment ... to which the Holders of the Ijunior
Debentures ... would be entitled except for the provisions of this
168. For a discussion of annulment, see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.

169. See Carlson, supra note 4.
170. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 560-64 (1971).
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Article shall be paid... directly to the holders of Senior Debt ...
;
and
(c) in the event that, notwithstanding the foregoing, any
payment ..shall be received by the... Uuniorl Holders... before
all Senior Debt is paid in full, such payment ..shall be paid over
to the holders of such Senior Debt ...for application to the
payment of all Senior Debt remaining unpaid until all such
"
Senior Debt shall have been paid in full ....
These provisions go on to require that, if senior debt is paid, the
junior creditors:
shall be subrogated to the rights of the holders of Senior Debt to
receive payments ...applicable to the Senior Debt until all
shall be paid in full, and,
amounts owing on the Debentures ...
as between the Company, its creditors other than holders of
Senior Debt, and the Ijunior creditors], no such payment ...
made to the holders of the Senior Debt ...
which otherwise would
have been made to the Ujunior creditors] shall be deemed a
payment by the Company on account of the Senior Debt, it being
understood that the provisions of this Article are and are
intended solely for the purpose of defining the relative rights of
the [junior creditors] on the one hand, and holders of the Senior
Debt, on the other hand.""
The subrogation clause operates as follows. Suppose X voluntarily
subordinates her claim to C 1 . C 1 is therefore entitled to double
dividends. Once C 1 is paid out, Xbecomes subrogated to C,'s claim.
Now it is X's turn to receive double dividends.1 73 While C 1 remains
unpaid, X obtains nothing and falls behind the neutral creditors.
But once C, is paid, X begins to catch up to the neutral creditors by
receiving X's own dividend plus (by subrogation) C,'s dividend.
The subrogation idea, however, falls out of the equitable
subordination equation. It is usually said of intentional tortfeasors
such as X that they have no right to contribution or indemnity.' 7 ' If
this instinct is applied to equitable subordination, then X, who is

171. Id. at 561-62.
172. Id. at 562.

173. Carlson, supra note 4, at 987-89.
174. See, e.g., Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1989).
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subordinated to C1 but not to the neutral creditors, will never
receive double dividends once C1 is paid out. C2 4, however, benefit

from the dividends that C1 no longer needs. A refusal to subrogate
X to C1 (after C, is paid) implies a windfall for C2 .4, though less of a
windfall than total demotion would have implied.
Nevertheless, even without a right of subrogation for X, X's
remaining claim, after assignment to C1 , will always exceed the
amount in the bankruptcy estate after C1.4 are paid out. It is
mathematically impossible for D ever to get a surplus, so that loss
of the subrogation right can never inhere to D's advantage. It does,
however, mean that C2.4 benefit, because if X has, no subrogation
right, X never has occasion to obtain double dividends once C, is
paid out.
D. The Origin of EquitableSubordination
1. Implicationsof Pepper v. Litton
I have shown that equitable subordination and fraudulent
transfer law engender the same remedy. This point is bolstered by
175
a study of the origin of equitable subordination. Pepper v. Litton
was the earliest case to invoke the phrase. In Pepper,the Supreme
Court perhaps implied that the doctrine existed as part of Virginia
law. 176 If this can be shown, then it should be clear that cases that
hold equitable subordination to be strictly federal are erroneous.
In Pepper,a coal company (D) owed back royalties to C'. 177 D was
controlled by X. 171 X brought suit against D, 179 and during the

lawsuit, D confessed judgment to X and other insiders for salary. 80
Xthen bought up all other insider claims, so that C, andXwere the
only creditors of D.'

175. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
176. Id. at 302-03.
177. Pepper v. Dixie Splint Coal Co., 181 S.E. 406, 408 (Va. 1935).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 407.
180. See Smith v. Litton, 188 S.E. 214 (Va. 1936).
181. Litton v. Pepper (In re Dixie Splint Coal Co.), 100 F.2d 830,831 (4th Cir. 1939), rev'd
308 U.S. 295 (1939).

20031

LOGICAL STRUCTURE

209

As a judgment creditor, X caused the sheriff to levy D's assets. "'
While this was occurring, C1 (now also a judgment creditor of D)
sought a declaration from the trial court that X's judgment was
void, because it had been confessed for D by a corporate officer with
no authority to do so.'" Just prior to the sheriffs sale, C 1 intervened
to ask that the sheriff allocate no funds to X."" Perhaps in light of
this dispute, X was made to pay cash for D's assets, instead of
bidding in his claims, as he otherwise might have done." 5 Faced
with competing claims to the cash he held, the sheriff interpleaded
X and C,.' 86 Soon thereafter, D filed for voluntary bankruptcy, and
both X and C consented to the bankruptcy trustee taking jurisher motion
diction over the interpleaded funds.'87 C1 also vacated
18
challenging the confessed judgment in state court.

Now in possession of the interpleaded fund, the bankruptcy
trustee sought a declaration from the Virginia state court that X's
judgment was procedurally defective. The Virginia court, however,
held the trustee to be estopped from challenging the judgment
because the only creditor of D (other thanX) was C1 , and C1 herself
was estopped from challenging X's judgment; she had earlier
intervened with the sheriff to obtain proceeds from the sheriffs
execution sale. 189 Such an intervention constituted C's admission
that X's judgment was valid. Since C1 was estopped, so was the
bankruptcy trustee. This holding was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Appeals in Virginia. 9 ° In short, so far as the Virginia
courts were concerned, D validly confessed judgment to X.
Back in the bankruptcy court, the district court judge still
disallowed X's claim, characterizing the state court ruling as
governing only the procedural aspect of the judgment, not the
substance of the claim underlying the judgment."'9 The judge held

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
31.
190.
191.

Id. at 831.
Smith, 188 S.E. at 214-15.
Id. at 214.
In re Dixie Splint, 100 F.2d at 831.
Id.
Id.
Smith, 188 S.E. at 214.
See id. at 215 (discussing findings of trial court); In re Dixie Splint, 100 F.2d at 830Smith, 188 S.E. at 214.
In re Dixie Splint, 100 F.2d at 832.
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that the substance could be revisited afresh. 92 Upon review, the
district court judge determined that X's claim was fraudulent and
disallowed it entirely. 9 ' X appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals sided with X; it held that res judicata prevented any
attack on the judgment.' 9'
On further appeal, the Supreme Court directly confronted the
issue ofresjudicata, and found it no impediment to disallowance of
X's claim under the name of equitable subordination:
In the first place, res judicata did not prevent the District Court
from examining into [X's] judgment and disallowing or
subordinating it as a claim. When that claim was attacked in the
bankruptcy court IX] did not show that the proceeding in the
state court was anything more than a proceeding under Virginia
practice to set aside the judgment in his favor on the ground
that it was irregular or void upon its face. He failed to show that
thejudgment in the statecourt was conclusive in his favor on the
validity or priorityof the underlyingclaim, as respects the other
creditors of the bankrupt corporation-a duty which was
incumbent on him. On the pleadings in the state court the
validity of the underlying claim was not in issue. Nor was there
presented to the state court the question of whether or not [X's]
judgment might be subordinated to the claims of other creditors
upon equitable principles. The motion on which that proceeding
was based challenged [X's] judgment on one ground only, viz.,
that it was void ab initio because it was not confessed by [D] in
the manner required by the Virginia statute and because [the
corporate secretary] did not have either an implied or express
power to confess it. In other words, in the state court under the
pleadings and practice, the only decree which was asked or
could be given in the plaintiffs favor was for cancellation of the
judgment as a record obligation of the bankrupt. It is therefore
plain that the issue which the bankruptcy court later considered
was not an issue in the trial of the cause in the state court and
could not be adjudicated there. Hence, the failure on the part of
[Xl to establish that the state judgment was resjudicata plus his
submission of his judgment to the bankruptcy court for
allowance (as a preferred claim to the extent that it was secured
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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by the alleged lien and as a common claim as respects the
deficiency) plainly left the bankruptcy court with full authority
to follow the course it took and to determine the validity of LX's]
alleged secured claim and the priority which should be accorded
it in the distribution of the bankrupt estate. 195
I contend that the above passage indicates that the state courts
could have ordered the equitable subordination of X's claim to that
of C,. This would tend to prove that the new doctrine of equitable
subordination was, in effect, simply what the Virginia courts would
have called a fraudulent transfer.
The first emphasized passage indicates that the bankruptcy
challenge to the subordinated claim was not barred by res judicata
precisely because the trustee could have brought the equitable
subordination theory before the Virginia court but did not. If he
had, res judicata would have indeed prevented revisitation of those
same issues in bankruptcy court.
The second emphasized passage, however, is more confusing. It
could be taken to mean that the Virginia courts could not have
given a remedy subordinating X's judgment to the trustee's
rights.' In that case, the trustee, of course, was free to litigate the
equitable subordination in bankruptcy court. But this same passage
can equally be read to mean that the Virginia court could not
equitably subordinate because the trustee did not ask for it.
I think the fairer implication is the latter. The bankruptcy
trustee could have claimed in Virginia state court thatX's judgment
was a fraudulent transfer. If he had, res judicata would have
prevented revisiting those same issues in bankruptcy court. This
can be seen from the Supreme Court's other great statement on res
judicata in the bankruptcy courts, Heiser v. Woodruff.'9 7
In Heiser, X successfully sued D for the tort of conversion in
California state court. 9 ' Later, D filed for bankruptcy.1 9 9 The bankruptcy trustee left the bankruptcy court and moved the California
195. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 302-03 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
196. The bankruptcy trustee, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, was (and still is) a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor representing all the creditors of the debtor. Bankruptcy Act

of 1898

§ 70(e) (repealed 1978).

197. 327 U.S. 726 (1946).

198. Id. at 729.
199. Id.
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trial court to overturn the judgment on the basis of fraud. 00 The
court denied the motion. 0 1
Back in bankruptcy court, the trustee attempted to object to X's
claim because of Xs alleged fraud on the court. 20 2 A divided
Supreme Court held that res judicata barred any further
examination of the merits. 20 3 According to the Heiser Court, since
the issues concerning fraud had been argued by the bankruptcy
trustee to the trial court in California, Xwas entitled to res judicata
against the trustee in bankruptcy court on the issue of fraud.20 4
This holding of the Supreme Court can fairly be taken to mean
that the bankruptcy trustee could have litigated, and indeed did
litigate, the matter in a nonbankruptcy forum. True, the remedy the
debtor sought was not characterized as subordination of one claim
to others, but rather relief from the judgment itself. But is this not
precisely the fraudulent transfer remedy? 2 5 And is not the Heiser
court equating fraudulent transfer remedies and equitable
subordination law? Heiser, then, supplies a reasonable inference
that state courts can entertain equitable subordination actions.
2. Origins in State Law of FraudulentTransfer
A close examination of Pepper v. Litton2' shows that the
Supreme Court relied at least in part on state law in constructing
the federal doctrine of equitable subordination. This reliance on
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id. at 739-40.
The Heiser Court stated that res judicata was appropriate in the case before it only

because:
[tihere was no equitable ground upon which his claim or the judgment upon it
could be set aside or subordinated to those of other creditors in the bankruptcy
proceeding, except that asserted by respondents that the judgment had been
procured by a fraud perpetrated on the judgment [creditor]. That issue, having
been twice litigated and decided in the court in which the judgment was

rendered, in proceedings brought by the trustee in bankruptcy and the
bankrupt, and by the bankrupt alone, may not now be relitigated in the
bankruptcy court.
Id.
205. Admittedly, relief from the judgment would be annulment in the erasure sense,
whereas this Article has argued that fraudulent transfer always transfers property to C 1 .
206. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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state law antecedents strongly suggests that the Supreme Court
viewed equitable subordination as already implicit in the state law
at the time.
Admittedly, some of the grounds cited in Pepper were clearly
federal in nature. The Bankruptcy Act, the Court observed, granted
power to bankruptcy courts over:
the allowance and disallowance of claims; the collection and
distribution of the estates of bankrupts and the determination
of controversies in relation thereto; the rejection in whole or in
part "according to the equities of the case" of claims previously
allowed; and the entering of such judgments "as may be
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions" of the Act. In
such respects thejurisdictionof the bankruptcycourt is exclusive
of all other courts. 7
This passage grounds equitable subordination in the exclusive
power of a bankruptcy court to decide matters of distribution of the
estate. Such a remark, however, taken to its extreme, would abolish
res judicata in the bankruptcy courts altogether. As Heiser
established, this goes too far. Rather, the matter should be as
follows: the bankruptcy courts must accept the doctrine of res
judicata-unless the judgment in question is a fraudulent transfer
or deserving of equitable subordination." 8
At least one major purpose of equitable subordination, then, is to
strike a blow against res judicata, where application of that
doctrine comes at the expense of the creditors.0 9 Yet this is an
207. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
208. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution applies only to state courts, not
the federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Nevertheless, by operation of federal statute, res
judicata is now part and parcel of bankruptcy law. Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (2000). But statutory res judicata cannot rise in dignity above statutory equitable
subordination. Both are provisions in the United States Code. Likewise, the trustee's
avoidance power under § 548(a) and § 544(b)(1) are of equal statutory dignity as the res
judicata principle. See generally James N. Duca & Cori Ann C. Yokota, The Role of Res
Judicatain Bankruptcy Claim Allowance Proceedings,17 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1995) (assessing

the worth of res judicata in bankruptcy court). Section 544(b)(1) incorporates state law by
reference, thereby undermining the strength of res judicata in bankruptcy proceedings.
209. An illustrative case in the equitable subordination vein is Societa Internazionale
Turismo v. Barr (In re Lockwood), 14 B.R. 374 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), where X filed a
complaint in New York Supreme Court to recover a debt that the debtors clearly did not owe.
The debtors answered, but this answer was struck from the record because the debtors did
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important function of fraudulent transfer law as well.210 Moreover,
it is possible to claim that equitable subordination itself originates
in fraudulent transfer law-a principle by no means exclusive to the
bankruptcy courts.
Indeed, Pepper'smost direct statement against res judicata is the
following: "[Tihe bankruptcy trustee may collaterally attack a
judgment offered as a claim against the estate for the purpose of
showing that it was obtained by collusion of the parties or is
founded upon no real debt." 21 ' For this proposition the Court cited
at least one case which is a classic fraudulent transfer case. 2
not provide the plaintiff with proper discovery. "Thus it is clear that the State Court action
was not resolved upon the merits of the Plaintiffs claim."Id. at 376. Ajudgment was entered
and docketed, and X claimed a judicial lien against D's real estate.
The bankruptcy court gave credence to the debtors' claim about the true merits of the
judgment obtained by plaintiffs:
In the case at bar the debtors and the trustee collaterally attack the Plaintiffs
judgment on the ground that it is "founded upon no real debt." It is undisputed
that in this case ... the validity of the Plaintiffs claim never has been fully
litigated. The state court judgment was not rendered upon the merits of the
case. It was a default judgment that was entered against the debtors aftertheir
answer was stricken for failure to comply with an order of the state court
requiring them to provide discovery. However, the default was not due to the
lack of diligence on the part of the debtors .... It appears that the gross
incompetence of the debtors' counsel, not the debtors' conduct, was the ground
for the entry of the default judgment. Under these circumstances the debtors
did not have "ample opportunity" to have their case heard. Moreover, the only
testimony adduced at the hearing convinces the court that the Plaintiffhad no
valid claim against the debtors.
Id. at 379-80 (footnotes and citations omitted). This case, in the name of equitable
subordination, directly authorizes a court to go behind a state court judgment to determine
the true merits. As such a remedy is also precisely what fraudulent transfer law achieves,
the two remedies can be seen as structurally identical. Since state courts can annul
judgments under the name of fraudulent transfer law, they should likewise have the power
to do the same thing under the name of equitable subordination.
210. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
211. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306.
212. Id. at 308 n.13 (citing Chandler v. Thompson, 120 F. 940 (7th Cir. 1902)). In
Chandler,X allegedly obtained a judgment against D on a fictional debt. C, (or perhaps the
bankruptcy trustee) objected to Xs proof of claim because "said confessions were designed
to hinder, delay and defraud [CJ] and the owners of said mortgages, and that the same are
fraudulent, and should be disallowed and discharged by this Honorable Court." Chandler,
120 F. at 940. The court ruled that C could have the remedy of disallowance of X's claim:
The averments, in the petition, of fraud and collusion are inartistically drawn.
They show in substance, however, that no real debt underlay the judgments,
but that the judgments were entered in pursuance of a scheme (to which both
judgment creditor and judgment debtor were parties) to hinder, delay, and
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In Pepper, the Court also looked to other aspects of state law as
grounds for the equitable subordination doctrine. Thus, it
emphasized that state courts have equitable power to examine
transfers to directors or stockholders from the corporation to which
they owe a fiduciary duty.2 13 This principle was drawn from
21
diversity actions to set aside mortgage foreclosures by fiduciaries '
or asset sales to other corporations,2 15 or to declare constructive
trusts with regard to fiduciary property. 216 The Court noted that,
because corporate officers are fiduciaries, equity would set aside the
claims of officers when they are in violation of state fiduciary law:
While normally that fiduciary obligation is enforceable directly
by the corporation, or through a stockholder's derivative action,
it is, in the event of bankruptcy of the corporation, enforceable
by the trustee. For that standard of fiduciary obligation is
defraud certain claimants, in the collection of claims ....
The case, thus presented, is not that of an attack collaterally upon the
judgments by the parties thereto, or their privies. It is the case of an attack by
the trustee of third persons, strangers to the judgment, whose rights and
interests would be injuriously affected, if the judgments were allowed to stand
proved as claims. As to such persons, a judgment procured through the
collusion of the parties thereto, and founded upon no real debt, is to be treated
as void, and open to collateral attack whenever, and wherever it may come in
conflict with their rights or interests. Ajudgment not founded on an actual debt
or other legal liability, due or enforceable at the time of its entry, will not be
upheld against creditors of the judgment debtor.
Id. (citations omitted). This case could fairly be interpreted as a fraudulent transfer case.
The two other cases cited by Justice Douglas seem less clearly fraudulent transfer cases.
In In re ContinentalEngine Co., 234 F. 58 (7th Cir. 1916), the court permitted disallowance
of a default judgment, when the merits had never been litigated. This is not so much a
fraudulent transfer case as a simple failure of res judicata. But see Kelleran v. Andrejevic,
825 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that default judgment entitled to res judicata,
where debtor was denied default relief in state court, but bankruptcy court could
nevertheless revisit the amount of damages).
In the second case cited, In re Thompson, 276 F. 313,315-16 (W.D. Pa. 1921), afld, 284 F.
65 (3d Cir. 1922), X had obtained a judgment that a mortgage debt was due. Nevertheless,
the bankruptcy trustee was permitted to show that the mortgage debt had been paid by
setoff. This case is probably not a fraudulent transfer. Rather, it is simply one in which the
trustee asserted D's right to prove that a judgment had been paid in a separate transaction.
213. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306.
214. See Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 588 (1875) (applying West Virginia
law); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 618 (1874) (applying Louisiana law).
215. See Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590,592 (1921) (applying Utah
Law).
216. See S. Pac. Corp. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1914) (applying New York law).
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designed for the protection of the entire community of interests
in the corporation-creditors as well as stockholders." 7

The Court went on to emphasize that equitable subordination
was simply the ordinary exercise of equity powers.2 1 Equity is
not limited to bankruptcy proceedings and so the Court conceived
that it was simply adapting nonbankruptcy law to the context of.
bankruptcy liquidations.
In further explaining the doctrine of equitable subordination, the
Pepper Court wrote: "The applicable principle is that, where a
corporation is so organized and controlled as to make it a mere
instrumentality or adjunct of another, and the subsidiary becomes
bankrupt, the parent corporation cannot have its claim paid until
all other claims are first satisfied .... "" Immediately following this
remark, Justice Douglas added: "The same result has been reached
22 0 At least after Erie,22 '
in equity receiverships."
equity receiverships
arise under state, not federal, law.2 22 Hence, the Supreme Court

itself recognized that the doctrine of equitable subordination was
founded in state law principles. Its extension into federal bankruptcy jurisprudence was therefore founded upon nonbankruptcy
antecedents.2 23
217. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 307 (footnotes omitted) (citing Converse v. United Shoe Mach.
Co., 95 N.E. 929 (Mass. 1911)).
218. Id. at 307.
219. Id. at 310 n.26 (citing In re Otsego Waxed Paper Co., 14 F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Mich.
1935)).
220. Id. (emphasis added) (citing S.G.V. Co. of Del. v. S.G.V. Co. of Pa., 107 A. 721 (Pa.
1919)).
221. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
222. E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228 (McKinney 1990); Paula W. Best, CorporateReceiverships
and Chapter1I Reorganizations,10 CARDOzO L. REV. 285 (1988). To be more precise, in preErie days, federal common law might have supplied the law of equity receivership.
223. An early and prestigious article on equitable subordination also characterizes
equitable subordination as the ordinary law of equity, not a unique federal bankruptcy
concept. See Aza S. Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordinationof Claims in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 113 (1961):
It seems to us that there has been much unwarranted confusion in connection
with the subordination of claims in bankruptcy. The equitable powers of the
bankruptcy court in dealing with claims have not been seriously challenged;
certainly not in recent years. In subordinating ethically inferior claims, no new
fundamental principles have evolved, nor have they been necessary in order to
cope with the problem. All that was required was the extension of cardinal
principles of equitable jurisprudence, long employed to thwart fraud and
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Other courts have found estoppel to be the ground of equitable
subordination. Obviously, estoppel is a classic state law principle.
In In re CreditIndustrial Corp.,224 the Second Circuit overruled a
lower court's refusal to enforce contractual subordination unless the
senior creditors could prove that they relied on the subordination
agreement in extending credit. The Second Circuit accused the
lower court of confusing contractual subordination with equitable
subordination:
Moreover, the enforcement of such agreements is not based on
any theory of equitable estoppel. In our opinion, the district
court erroneously relied on the doctrine of equitable estoppel as
a basis for its position and failed to recognize the distinction
between equitable and consensual subordination in bankruptcy.
Equitable subordination, which is founded upon estoppel, is the
doctrine invoked by courts to deny equal treatment to creditors
based on some inequitable or unconscionable conduct in which
they have engaged, or a special position which they occupy
vis-a-vis the bankrupt that justifies subordination of their
claims. On the other hand, consensual or contractual
subordination, of which the debt subordination agreements
involved here are prime examples, occurs when a creditor and
the bankrupt agree to create priorities among debts. Such
agreements have been uniformly enforced according to their
terms by bankruptcy courts. The doctrine of equitable estoppel
is clearly irrelevant to a determination of whether a lawful
subordination agreement is enforceable in bankruptcy
proceedings and the district court erred in invoking it to support
its determination that enforcement of such agreements is
conditioned on proof of reliance. 2"
inequity, into a new field ....
The basic and overriding consideration of equity is the prevention of fraud and
injustice when the remedy at law is inadequate. Where the facts indicate that
allowance of a claim on equal terms with others would constitute an injustice,
subordination is the remedy afforded by equity. And, where man's ingenuity
creates new situations without precise factual precedent, equity has the

capacity to adapt itself. In so doing, equity will be found equal to the task,
extending old principles, if necessary, to accomplish its purpose.

Id.
224. 366 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1966).
225. Id. at 408-09 (citations omitted). For a pre-Peppercase using estoppel to demote a
creditor, see Miller v. Borton (In re Bowman Hardware& Elec. Co.), 67 F.2d 792 (7th Cir.

1933).
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In truth, the invocation of estoppel inadequately describes equitable
subordination. It supports the notion of disallowing a claim
altogether, when the more precise definition of equitable
subordination involves the transferof the subordinated claim to the
creditors harmed by wrongful conduct. Nevertheless, the
identification of estoppel, a state law principle, as the ground of
equitable subordination tends to discredit the notion that state
courts are unable to construct a doctrine of equitable subordination.
It at least supports the notion that equitable subordination has a
state law ground, though the position I have maintained here is
that fraudulent transfer, not estoppel, is the correct ground.
E. Examples of Equitable SubordinationUnder Nonbankruptcy
Law
2 2 the Second Circuit
In HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank,
ruled there
was no cause of action under New York law for equitable subordination. HBE Leasing was therefore a diversity case, and, as
such, a mere "Erieguess"22 7 as to what New York law really was.
There is evidence, however, that equitable subordination is
directly part of the law of New York. In Shultis v. Woodstock Land
Development Associates,2 2 a New York court subordinated a senior
mortgagee to the extent a newly executed mortgage agreement
prejudiced a junior mortgagee. This theory has been expressly
labeled by courts as a theory of equitable subordination.2" Like
examples can be located in the law of other states. 23
A recent bank liquidation case shows a nonbankruptcy court
borrowing the doctrine of equitable subordination from the United
States Bankruptcy Code and applying it as a matter of federal

226. 48 F.3d 623 (2d Cir. 1995).
227. McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2000).
228. 594 N.Y.S.2d 890 (App. Div. 1993).
229. Depan, Eichenberger & Knowles, Inc. v. Greenbriar Props. I, 607 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179
(App. Div. 1994) (describing Shultis as setting forth "a cause of action for equitable
subordination"); Skaneateles Sav. Bankv. Herold, 376 N.Y.S.2d286 (App. Div. 1975) (holding
that "equity" demanded partial subordination of mortgage).
230. See, e.g., Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989);
Trus Joist Corp. v. Natl Union Fire Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 603, 609 (N.J. App. 1983); First
Heights Bank v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 609-10 (Tex. App. 1993).
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23 involved the liquidation of a nationally
common law. Gaffv. FDIC
chartered bank. For historic reasons, banks have always been
exempt from bankruptcy laws in the United States. 2 Nationally
chartered banks instead are liquidated under the National Bank
Act, which calls for pro rata distributions to creditors."' The
National Bank Act has no provision authorizing equitable
subordination.
In Gaff, shareholders of a failed bank sought damages under
Michigan law from officers and directors of the bank. The receiver
for the bank asserted a derivative claim on behalf of the bank. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals directed that the shareholder claim
be equitably subordinated to that of the receiver. This relief was
granted, thereby proving that equitable subordination was not
simply the province of the federal Bankruptcy Code. Rather, the
court introduced equitable subordination into the common law of
bank receiverships. 2""
Subsequent cases, however, have disapproved of Gaff. Their
objection was that Congress had considered but rejected a legislative enactment expressly subordinating shareholder actions to
actions by a bank receiver. These subsequent cases therefore
assumed that a rule of equitable subordination violated the intent
of Congress.235 These cases did not dispute, however, the exportability in general of the doctrine of equitable subordination from
bankruptcy law to general common law. Indeed, one of the traditional three elements of equitable subordination is that the remedy
must not contradict a specific congressional intent, just as equity
must always honor specific statutory enactments. 6 The cases
opposing Gaffsimply stand for the (dubious) proposition that, in the
exact situation of a bank receiver competing with a shareholder
for the assets of former bank officers, Congress intended the
shareholders to be on a par with the bank receiver.

231. 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
232. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(bX2) (1978).
233. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (2003); see also Gaff, 919 F.2d at 385 n.1.
234. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 387.
235. See Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1990); Greenfield v. Shuck, 867 F.
Supp. 62, 70 (D. Mass. 1994).
236. See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692,700 (5th Cir. 1977).
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CONCLUSION

This Article argued that, while the moral intuitions behind
equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer differ, the
remedies are structurally identical. Both aim to transferproperty
from some third party to a set of creditors with claims against a
debtor. Properly theorized, fraudulent transfer law never rescinds,
annuls, avoids, or erases. Rather, it transfers rights of third parties
to those creditors with fraudulent transfer rights. Equitable subordination never demotes or rearranges priorities. It transfers
bankruptcy dividends to a set of creditors who were harmed by a
creditor's inequitable conduct. Accordingly, since the fraudulent
transfer remedy is a routine feature of state law, equitable subordination might likewise be invoked as a matter of state law.
2 " to the contrary should
Cases like HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank
therefore be viewed as bad "Erie guesses" 23 8 as to the content of
state law.
If fraudulent transfers and equitable subordinations were recast in these terms, certain admittedly marginal cases could be
solved in a way that better accords with the spirit of debtor-creditor
law. Although the effect a reform of vocabulary would have on the
outcome of actual cases is perhaps not large, nevertheless it is the
marginal case that proves the true nature of the theory that
underlies this, or any other, area of law.

237. 48 F.3d 623 (2d Cir. 1995).
238. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.

